



## Abbreviations and Acronyms

AF	Armed Force
AG	Armed Group
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CBR	Community Based Reintegration
CCI	Cross Cutting Issue
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EA	Environmental Assessment
EAC	East African Community
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
EDRP	Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
EDPRS	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
ERM	Environmental Risk Management
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FDG	Focus Group Discussion
FMFA	Financial Management Framework Agreement
FARG	Fund for the Support of Genocide Survivors
FPP	Final Project Proposal
GoR	Government of Rwanda
HQ	Head Quarters
IA	Implementing Agency
ICRS	Information, Counselling and Referral System
IGA	Income Generating Activities
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPP	Initial Project Proposal
KII	Key Informant Interview
LODA	Local Administrative Entities Development Agency
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIC	Middle Income Country
MINALOC	Ministry of Local Government (Rwanda)
MIS	Management Information System
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NCPD	National Council for Persons with Disabilities
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OP/BP	Operational Policy / Bank Procedures
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PIP	Project Implementation Plan
PMU	Project Management Unit
PNDDR	Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration
RDF	Rwandan Defence Force
RDRC	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
RDFRF	Rwanda Defence Force Reserve Force
RDRP	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
RFQ	Request for Quotations

SC	Steering Committee
SEDRP	Second Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
SPIP	Social Protection Implementation in Planning
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TA	Technical Assistance
TDRP	Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program
TL	Team Leader
TOR	Terms of Reference
TT	Task Team
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNMISS	United Nations Mission to South Sudan
VCT	HIV/AIDS Voluntary Counselling and Testing
VOIP	Voice Over Internet Protocol
WB	World Bank

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## **Note on Data**

In the evaluation, data on activities and outputs pertains to Q3 2014 to Q4 2015 as per the Request for Proposal (RfP) and the subsequent contract with the RDRC. Data from the Tracer, CDS and PVS studies, used to assess performance as per the project result framework, pertains to 2016 as all three studies were conducted in Q3 and Q4 2016.

# I Executive Summary

## I.1 Project Background

1. During the period under review for this evaluation (July 2014 to December 2015) the project has continued to perform solidly in a largely positive external environment but one with some limitations that are largely outside the control of the project.
2. The political economy of Rwanda has reflected a stable macro-political environment and “remarkable development successes over the last decade which include high growth, rapid poverty reduction and, since 2005, reduced inequality.”<sup>1</sup> Economically, the country has performed well as it works to transform sustainably into a middle income country (MIC).<sup>2</sup> Rwanda has maintained a 6.9 percent economic growth rate and macroeconomic stability for the first three quarters of 2015, and projects a growth rate of 6.8 percent in 2016.<sup>3</sup> In July 2016 it remained at 5.6 percent.<sup>4</sup>
3. Rwanda’s remarkable economic growth and its progress in poverty reduction and social inclusion create a strong pull for ex-combatants into the labour market and towards the increasingly effective social protection mechanisms of the Rwanda State. Positive country conditions have meant that, economically, ex-combatants have on the whole been absorbed into the labour market (to different extents, depending on the classification of ex-combatant)<sup>5</sup> and the positive social environment of reconciliation and peace building.
4. As evidenced by the 2016 Community Dynamics Study (CDS) for recently integrated ex-combatants, solid economic performance can lead to price inflation particularly on productive assets. Hence challenges are emerging around affordable access to productive land and, as documented in the Payment Verification Study (PVS), there is some subsequent outmigration from the Eastern Provinces (largely to Uganda but also elsewhere in the East African Community (EAC)). This connection between access to affordable productive assets and regional migration would benefit from a dedicated further study in order to fully explore the phenomenon.
5. While the domestic situation in Rwanda appears well aligned to successful and sustainable DDR impact in the DRC, the most recent assessment of the situation pertaining to AGs of Rwandan origin operating in DRC states that the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR) and allied elements “remain a serious threat to civilians in North Kivu”. The presence of the FDLR, and its clashes with opposing groups, has contributed to “an overall deterioration of the security situation and further displacement of the population”.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup><http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview>. Accessed November 30th 2016.

<sup>2</sup>World Bank, 2014 (a): 1.

<sup>3</sup>Ishihara, Yoichiro; Bundervoet, Tom; Sanghi, Apurva; Nishiuchi, Toru. 2016. *Rwanda - Economic update: Rwanda at work*. Rwanda economic update; no. 9. Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group.

<sup>4</sup><http://www.tradingeconomics.com/rwanda/gdp-growth-annual>. Accessed December 15th 2016.

<sup>5</sup>Finn, 2015; Finn et al, 2012.

<sup>6</sup>UN Security Council (3<sup>rd</sup> October 2016). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 7.

6. In this complex context<sup>7</sup>, the SEDRP has performed well and, as the project enters its final calendar year before planning for closure, there are strong indicators of sustainable positive impact on the economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants.

## **I.2 Methodology**

7. The evaluation used a standard methodology of: (i) comprehensive document review; (ii) qualitative key informant interviews (KIIs); (iii) qualitative focus group discussions (FGDs) with community members and ex-combatants; (iv) on-going data triangulation with emerging reporting from the RDRC, the World Bank and the others involved in implementation or on the margins of the project; and (v) analysis built on the 2015/2016 Tracer, 2016 Community Dynamics Study (CDS) and the 2016 Payment Verification Study (PVS). In total, the following consultations are the foundation for the evaluation:

- (a) 1,795 quantitative surveys combined into 3 databases (including a merged 2015-2016 Tracer database);
- (b) 302 qualitative consultations of which 36 were conducted specifically during the evaluation field visits (including 33 transcripts and 28 MP3s);
- (c) 8 site visits, including 4 specifically for the evaluation (Mutobo, Muhoza, Cooperatives in Northern Province and Gacuriro VCT).

8. This independent evaluation of the project was conducted during November and December 2016 following data validation and analysis from the 2016 Tracer Study, CDS and PVS. The evaluation should be read in conjunction with the 2016 Tracer, CDS and PVS reports and with the 42 field reports shared with the RDRC by the consultancy team.

9. Each study (Tracer, CDS, PVS and evaluation) encountered limitations with each separately documenting these limitations, their impact on data and analysis and how the limitations were managed. The following were the main challenges *specific* to the evaluation:

Period under review -As per the RfP, the evaluation addresses project performance between July 2014 and December 2015. In line with contracting, the evaluation was not implemented until Q4 2016. The result is a disjuncture between the period under review and when information is collected. Consequently, certain elements of the project have moved on and respondents may more accurately reflect achievements and challenges encountered closer to the time the evaluation was conducted (i.e. during 2016). As is reflected in the evaluation recommendations, the evaluation team advised the RDRC that the next evaluations should be contracted in Q1 2017 and finally catch up the period under evaluation prior to the close of the SEDRP in December 2017.

## **I.3 Findings and Recommendations of the 2016 Independent Evaluation**

10. The independent evaluation presents 19 findings and 12 recommendations. This represents the full findings and recommendations of the study.

11. **Finding 1.** The evaluation finds that the project is likely to achieve its PDO (Project Development Objective) by the proposed close of the project in December 2017. At the time of

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<sup>7</sup>See Section 1.1 below.

the evaluation, the project has supported the Government of Rwanda (GoR) to demobilise members of AGs of Rwandan origin and members from the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) to the extent that the RDF cohort has been completed (and some ex-AF have availed of reintegration services during the time since demobilisation of ex-AF was mainstreamed in 2013). The project has supported the GoR in providing a wide variety of socio-economic reintegration support to demobilised ex-combatants and their dependants and has supported the GoR to focus on vulnerable sub-groups.

12. Overall, the project has contributed to the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants, something which by now has an established evidence base<sup>8</sup> with good comparators with ordinary community members. Highlights relevant to the PDO and objectives of the project are:<sup>9</sup>

- (a) There is a positive decrease in reliance on the RDRC for general support, down from 24.6 percent to 8.7 percent (-15.9 percent), and particularly with ex-AG (24.3 percent to 3.8 percent).
- (b) Reliance on RDRC for support in times of economic crisis remains low (8.0 percent in 2016 compared to 4.0 percent in 2014).
- (c) There are increases in reliance on mainstream banking and on one's own savings when dealing with economic crisis. In general, 12.8 percent more ex-combatants will resort to mainstream financial institutions (up from 0.0 percent) of which the largest increase is ex-AF (+20.0 percent; ex-AG +7.0 percent).
- (d) There are similar increases in reliance on savings: +23.0 percent for ex-AF and +13.0 percent for ex-AG.
- (e) Furthermore, ex-combatants report an increased membership of SACCO, up generally by 14.0 percent (+11.0 percent to 35.1 percent for ex-AF and +16.0 percent to 37.1 percent for ex-AG), and a decrease in defaults on credit of -18 percent for ex-AF to 14.0 percent and -12.0 percent to 4.2 percent for ex-AG.
- (f) Unemployment also shows a decrease, most markedly for disabled ex-combatants (-21.0 percent to 24.3 percent of disabled respondents) with a general decrease of -7.0 percent to 22.3 percent.
- (g) In 2016 there is no general change in ex-combatants reporting that they are able to access social services through local government or central government social services offices (rather than through the RDRC). Specifically, the level remains at 74.3 percent (71.1 percent in 2014) with the major changes being for former child ex-combatants (-15.0 percent to 72.5 percent) and disabled ex-combatants (+15.0 percent to 66.7 percent).

13. **Finding 2.** The evaluation finds that the project has successfully demobilized all RDF that fell within the purview of the project (4,000 RDF ex-combatants, including 4 female ex-

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<sup>8</sup> See: Finn, Anthony. SEDRP Tracer 2014 and SEDRP Tracer 2016.

<sup>9</sup>Source: 2016 Tracer, 2016 CDS, 2016 PVS.

combatants and 110 disabled ex-combatants). This is in completion of all eligible RDF demobilisations.

14. **Finding 3.** The evaluation finds that the project has successfully demobilized all AGs in line with demand. This finding is presented in recognition that this is the number of AGs documented by the RDRC and no independent data has been identified to contradict this or to quantify those refused due to being ‘recyclers’ or civilians (4,376 AGs, including 26 female ex-combatants, 183 former child combatants and 128 disabled ex-combatants).

15. **Finding 4.** The evaluation finds that, in total and according to the data provided by the RDRC, 100 percent of demand has been met.<sup>10</sup> No independent data has been identified to contradict this finding.

16. **Finding 5.** The evaluation finds that the project has successfully reached the 2016 target prescribed in the revised M&E Framework for economically active ex-combatants: 75.1 percent of ex-combatants are economically active. This figure is in comparison to 73.3 percent of civilians.<sup>11</sup>

17. **Finding 6.** The evaluation finds that the project has by and large met its target prescribed in the revised project paper for social acceptance (65 percent) with 62.9 percent of ex-combatants (68.3 percent ex-AF and 56.2 percent ex-AG) reporting that they feel accepted in their immediate community.<sup>12</sup> This compares with 72.0 percent of community members indicating acceptance. Of female ex-combatants, 59.0 percent report that they feel accepted and of disabled ex-combatants 66.7 percent report that they feel accepted. Of former child combatants, 40.9 percent report that they are accepted.

18. **Finding 7.** The evaluation finds that the project has failed to meet the 2016 target prescribed in the revised M&E Framework for satisfaction with demobilization services (80 percent). Specifically, 73.1 percent of ex-combatants indicate that they are satisfied with the Demobilisation Centre, with 17.5 percent indicating that they were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. As is seen below, the evaluation recommends that, based on the more detailed analysis of particular aspects of the services delivered in Mutobo, the project can be considered to have **satisfactorily** performed in this regard.

19. **Finding 8.** The evaluation finds that when surveyed regarding the kinds of service improvements that they would like to see at the centres, adult<sup>13</sup> ex-combatants responded that the three areas where most felt that there could be improvements were: medical care (26.4 percent), travel to location for settlement (20.4 percent) and identification of where one will resettle or relocate (19.7 percent).

20. **Finding 9.** The evaluation finds that the project has successfully achieved the target for 2016 as prescribed by the revised M&E Framework (95 percent) for BNK (Basic Reinsertion Kit/

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Source: 2016 CDS dataset.

<sup>12</sup>The data, as asked on the survey forms, broke social acceptance into small extent and great extent. So in order to get the comparative measure with the previous evaluation we present an aggregate value. *Social acceptance* was measured from the ex-combatant to community member survey.

<sup>13</sup>Former child combatants were surveyed separately. There are statistically insufficient numbers of former child ex-combatants in the 2016 PVS.

Basic Needs Kit) with 98.0 percent of eligible ex-combatants indicating that they received the BNK.<sup>14</sup> Of those who received the BNK, 72.5 percent received it on the day of discharge and 27.5 percent after discharge day. Of those who received the BNK after discharge day, 45.5 percent indicated they received it within the 30-day window and 54.5 percent indicated that they received it outside the 30-day window. Only n10 of those eligible to receive the RG responded they did not receive it on time. Of that n10, n6 identified that it was due to not having a viable subproject and n4 gave a variety of responses including that they were away at the time of imbursement, lack of paperwork, lack of bank account and not being registered with the Sector office.

21. **In response to this finding the RDRC has observed that ex-combatants** may have confused the BNK with other benefits given after discharge (especially RG)) because they all use BNK partly for transport to the community.

22. **Finding 10.**The evaluation finds that the project has met its target for Reinsertion kit (RK) as prescribed in the revised M&E Framework. It delivered RKs to 94.8 percent of eligible dependents of ex-combatants.<sup>15</sup> Of those whose families received the RK, 95.6 percent received it on discharge day.

23. **Finding 11.**The evaluation finds that the project has successfully met its target (95 percent) as prescribed by the M&E Framework with, at the time of evaluation, 98.4 percent of respondents identifying that they had freely chosen their community of reinsertion.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, the reasons given for choosing the place of resettlement were: family (85.9 percent), economic reasons (47.5 percent), safety and security (35.7 percent) and education opportunities (8.0 percent).<sup>17</sup> Access to food and shelter was not measured.

24. **Finding 12.**The evaluation finds that the project has met its target regarding RG (Reintegration Grant) as prescribed in the revised M&E Framework with 92.4 percent of eligible ex-combatants receiving the RG. Of these, 87.5 percent received the payment within three months after their return to their community of choice. Of those who indicated they received a late payment n6 indicated three weeks late, n4 indicated 1 week late, and n3 indicated 4 weeks late. These are statistically insignificant numbers.

25. **Finding 13.** Regarding the M&E Framework target of 90 percent of ex-combatants selected to receive Vulnerability Support Window (VSW) support and registered to receive training and who have successfully completed training/education, due to routing in the 2016 PVS it is challenging to independently verify the performance of the project in this regard. The RDRC reports that 100 percent completed the relevant supported activities in line with benefits to vulnerable ex-combatants.<sup>18</sup>

26. The 2016 PVS identifies that 65.9 percent of ex-combatants used their VSW for skills training (50.0 percent of ex-AF, 70.8 percent of ex-AG, and 35.7 percent of disabled combatants). Also, 25.9 percent used the VSW support for IGA (Income Generating Activities) with two weeks of training (40.0 percent of ex-AF, 21.5 percent of ex-AG, and 50.0 percent of disabled ex-

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<sup>14</sup>Source: 2016 PVS dataset.

<sup>15</sup>Source: 2016 PVS dataset.

<sup>16</sup>Source: 2016 PVS dataset.

<sup>17</sup>Source: 2016 PVS dataset. Multiple responses permitted.

<sup>18</sup>RDRC, 2015d: 28.

combatants). Finally, 8.2 percent used it for formal education (10.0 percent of ex-AF, 7.7 percent of ex-AG and 14.3 percent of disabled ex-combatants).

27. If one uses a satisfaction criterion to indicate success, then 84.2 percent of the VSW respondents were satisfied (successful) in training and of the n7 who received formal education n4 were satisfied with the support.

28. **Finding 14.** The evaluation finds that the project failed to meet the target as prescribed in the revised M&E Framework (75 percent) of ex-combatants receiving mental health screening with 67.5 percent of adult ex-combatants reporting that they were screened for mental health issues while in the demobilisation centre. However, it should be noted that a high proportion (and, arguably, one within the statistical margin of error) of 71.8 percent of dependents received mental health screening and 96.3 percent of ex-combatants received medical screening. It is therefore likely that the failure to reach the target in mental health screening is related to the on-going capacity challenges at the Medical Rehabilitation Unit.

29. **Finding 15.** The evaluation finds that regarding access to *Mutuelles de Santé* for disabled ex-combatants the project has failed to reach the 2016 target as prescribed by the revised M&E Framework (95 percent). The evaluation finds that, of the cohort of categorised disabled ex-combatants, 78.9 percent have *Mutuelles de Santé*. This differs from the CDS, whereby 87.1 percent of disabled ex-combatants have cover, and the Tracer, whereby 80.0 percent have cover. Of the same overall cohort, 64.7 percent (n34) received their Monthly Allowance, of which 71.4 (n21) percent did so within the 9-month timeframe.

30. There is a significant correlation between whether an ex-combatant has *Mutuelles de Santé* and the year of demobilisation. It appears that the more recently demobilised respondents have a lower allocation/uptake than those demobilised prior to 2014. Amongst those ex-combatants who have *Mutuelles de Santé*, only 45.7 percent were demobilised between 2014 and 2016. Amongst those who do not have *Mutuelles de Santé*, 77.1 percent were demobilised in between 2014 and 2016.

31. **Finding 16.** The evaluation finds that the project has successfully met its target as prescribed by the revised M&E Framework for issuance of national IDs. In total, 90.1 percent of ex-combatants received a national ID card at the demobilisation centre. The evaluation observes that, recognising the centrality of national IDs to many everyday processes (such as obtaining a phone with airtime), the RDRC has proactively pushed back the delivery date of ID cards so that they are allocated earlier in the demobilisation process. Theoretically, this will also improve the tracking of ex-combatants and improve the accuracy of the RDRC's MIS.

32. **Finding 17.** The evaluation finds that the relevance of the project objectives is rated **high**. Similarly, the relevance of project design is rated **high**.

33. **Finding 18.** The evaluation finds that the effectiveness in progress made towards achieving the PDO is rated **substantial** because (i) the project has met the demand for demobilization, and (ii) has performed well in the timely and accurate provision of reinsertion and reintegration supports.

34. **Finding 19.** The evaluation finds that the sustainability of the project is rated **substantial** because: (i) historically, Tracer studies have returned a positive picture for the reintegration of ex-combatants, indicating that the positive impact of the project is stable; (ii) the comparison of 2014

to 2016 Tracer (and incidentally CDS) data confirms a stable, good performance and a plateauing of impact; (iii) the GoR has committed in legislation to continue the work of the RDRC post-SEDRP and thus services to ex-combatants are likely to be maintained; and (iv) the project strongly aligns with other GoR social protection policies and programming and a large proportion of ex-combatants are clearly self-reliant and can have access to mainstream services if required. The main risk to the impact pertains to the precise allocations from central government to targeted assistance for particularly disadvantaged ex-combatants, and the established perception of many local authorities that vulnerable ex-combatants are not an issue for mainstream services but rather are exclusively under the purview of the RDRC.

35. **Recommendation 1.** While strictly the project may have failed to meet the target set as per the results framework for satisfaction with demobilization services, the evaluation recommends that, based on the more detailed analysis of particular aspects of the services delivered in Mutobo, the project can be considered to have **satisfactorily** performed in this regard.

36. Specifically, while at an overview level 73.1 percent of ex-combatants indicated satisfaction, 88.8 percent indicated satisfaction with the PDOP and 82.6 percent indicated satisfaction with the training received while at the centre. Comments in the project paper note that the project expected the profile of demobilizing ex-combatants to change with an increased proportion of forced demobilization, which may impact satisfaction rates. The surveys did not target whether repatriation was voluntary or forced but field reporting and qualitative work did not encounter any proportion of ex-combatants indicating that they had been forced to return.

37. **Recommendation 2.** The evaluation observes that some recent demobilisations appear to have moved outside of Rwanda (a positive indicator of freedom of movement in the EAC) in order to locate economic opportunities in neighbouring countries, particularly those ex-combatants who chose to resettle in the Eastern Province. Intelligence, including that acquired through networks of key stakeholders (along with no evidence of social tension as a driver of migration in the 2016 CDS), indicates that these ex-AGs are largely in Uganda and Tanzania. Issues such as (i) lack of economic opportunity in the Eastern Province; (ii) the cost differentiation between renting land for agriculture in Rwanda vs. elsewhere in the EAC; and (iii) freedom of movement in the EAC contribute to higher than anticipated migration. The evaluation recommends that the project explore how to better analyse and understand the dynamics at play for ex-AGs in the Eastern Province.

38. **Recommendation 3.** The evaluation observes that it remains the case that the Medical Rehabilitation Unit (MRU) appears under-staffed and under-resourced. Some staff in the MRU appear chronically overworked and, while the RDRC indicates that it will hire three (3) new psychologists before the end of 2016, the evaluation recommends that the Commission better addresses the alleviation of immediate acute pressures (the issue with phone access persists, for example) while aligning the work of the MRU (particularly in mental health) with better access to mainstream infrastructures and services. One example of this is finding how the MRU can have ambulance support for transporting often violent (to staff or to themselves) patients who currently are being moved in a pick-up without paramedic support or security for the staff. Violent incidents have occurred, as have dangerous absconding of patients while in transit.

39. It is **critical** that the RDRC brings these observations and the further expertise of field staff to the conversation with government around mainstreaming and budget allocations for mental health.

40. Similarly, efforts to sensitise the community appear to have occurred but not in any planned, systematic way or in a manner specific to de-mystifying how to seek help for ex-combatants in a family enduring mental health challenges, particularly acute or newly emerged challenges. This should also be on the table for highlighting with the relevant line ministries and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN).

41. **Recommendation 5.** The evaluation finds that by design the project M&E indicators have been clear and practical. However, some indicators in the revised M&E Framework would benefit from further revision to extract nuances in the data and add an element of comparability (with civilian population). Detailed revisions are in the main text of the report.

42. **Recommendation 6.** Based on the review of the current batch of M&E studies being implemented for the RDRC, the evaluation recommends that the largely random sampling approach should be replaced with purposive sampling in order to begin to address the under-representation of vulnerable groups and avoid sample bias towards large population groups. The evaluation finds that the RDRC should devolve sampling responsibility to the consultants and retain oversight.

43. **Recommendation 7.** The evaluation observes that the RDRC has worked for sometime in a manner consistent with mainstreaming (as outlined earlier in this report) and has already begun the advocacy at central government level, including in MINACOFIN, for allocations sufficient to maintain the appropriate level of DDR for ex-combatants (as of September 2016) and is planning further mainstreaming activities for 2017.

44. That said, the evaluation recommends that the Commission takes time to ensure it has the appropriate strategy, skills and assistance to make this transition, while respecting and supporting affected staff. Critically, the impact of organisational change on current staff performance and thus the institutional performance should not be underestimated.

45. **Recommendation 8.** Regarding the RDRC's exit strategy to the project, the evaluation observes that the centre of excellence is a challenging, exciting and complex project that physically is well under way. Following consultations during the evaluation period, the evaluation makes the following recommendations:

- (a) **Recommendation 8a.** The evaluation agrees with the RDRC that it should consider revisiting the design and remit of the centre with facilitation by an external consultant. This would help clarify the objectives and the broad strategy governing the establishment and implementation of this enterprise. The evaluation recommends that the RDRC proceeds with this course of action as a matter of urgency.
- (b) **Recommendation 8b.** The evaluation recommends that, with the help of an external facilitator, the RDRC develop a more detailed project concept note and tailors the document to different audiences and stakeholders, including potential domestic and international partners and donors.
- (c) **Recommendation 8c.** The evaluation recommends that the RDRC continue to consider domestic partners (Peace Building Institute, for example) as well as international partially or fully comparable models, including for proposed activities such as training courses, placement for research students and international DDR training.

- (d) **Recommendation 8d.** The evaluation recommends that the RDRC fully investigate complementarities and collaboration with the African Union DDR Capacity Program (AU DDRCP). The evaluation team has introduced the RDRC to the team at the AU DDRCP and begun the process of exploring linkages.
  
- (e) **Recommendation 8e.** The evaluation recommends that the RDRC, in collaboration with the World Bank team, explore potential seed funding via the trust fund structures in the World Bank. The evaluation team has shared further details on this with the RDRC management.

# 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

## 1.1 Project Context

46. The evaluation addresses the performance of the project over an 18 month period from July 2014 to December 2015. During this timeframe, the project was financed by:

Additional Financing (AF) (Credit) of US\$8.97 million (May 1<sup>st</sup> 2014 to December 31<sup>st</sup> 2017).<sup>19</sup>

47. The AF was formally requested by the Government of Rwanda to finance the scaling up of the original project through extending demobilization and reintegration services for additional incoming ex-combatants from Armed Groups (AGs) repatriating from the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

48. Throughout the period under review the project has retained a regional focus whereby the demobilization of Rwandan AG combatants is identified as a means of improving regional security and stability and not just the security and stability of Rwanda.

49. The project context consists of: (i) the success of the preceding project (EDRP) and the strong performance of the SEDRP over time; (ii) the strong economic and social performance of Rwanda; and (iii) the on-going instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

50. As identified in previous evaluations and as is the case now as the RDRC prepares for the planned closure of the project in December 2017, the SEDRPhas continued to build on the success of the EDRP<sup>20</sup> while targeting the remaining cohort of Armed Groups (AGs) in the DRC, which is estimated to amount to between 2000-5000 combatants and dependents.<sup>21</sup> The project has a consistent strong performance across most project indicators as per the project M&E Framework and as measured via successive Tracer studies, CDS and PVS. This pedigree is a strong foundation for the good current (evaluation period) performance of the project.

51. The political and financial economy of Rwanda has reflected a stable macro-political environment and “remarkable development successes over the last decade which include high growth, rapid poverty reduction and, since 2005, reduced inequality”.<sup>22</sup>

52. It is the World Bank’s analysis that Rwanda has “delivered economic growth, [experienced] a significant decline in poverty, and a reduction in inequality”.<sup>23</sup> However, theWorld Bank assesses that the “post-conflict dividend” is exhausted and Rwanda is facing the

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<sup>19</sup>The original project was a follow up to the Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (EDRP) that became effective on September 27, 2002 and closed on December 31, 2008. The original grant of SDR5.2 million (US\$8.0 million equivalent) for the SEDRP was approved on August 27, 2009, and became effective on June 9, 2010. A first AF for US\$2.3 million, also from the MDTF, was signed on December 30, 2013. The US\$2.3 million AF was processed separately from the AF for IDA to ensure continuation of the program beyond December 31, 2013, and extend the project until June 30, 2014. The GoR and IDA agreed it would be beneficial to continue the collaboration for Demobilization and Reintegration activities in Rwanda beyond the current closing date stated in the legal documents of June 30, 2014. This is why this new AF is being proposed. World Bank (2014a): 1.

<sup>20</sup> GIZ, 2010; World Bank, 2009.

<sup>21</sup> <http://monusco.unmissions.org/en/foreign-armed-groups>. Accessed November 30th, 2016. Does not include dependants.

<sup>22</sup><http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview>. Accessed November 30th, 2016.

<sup>23</sup>World Bank, 2014 (a): 1.

challenge of transitioning to a middle income country (MIC).<sup>24</sup> In order to maintain the country's focus on poverty reduction and reducing the subsidy of foreign aid, the World Bank has emphasised the need to ensure that the private sector is at the forefront of economic strategy and development.<sup>25</sup> The country has maintained a 6.9 percent economic growth rate and macroeconomic stability for the first three quarters of 2015, and has achieved 5.6 percent growth by the close of Q2 2016.<sup>26,27</sup>

53. Rwanda's remarkable economic growth and its progress in poverty reduction and social inclusion create a strong pull for ex-combatants into the labour market and towards the increasingly effective social protection framework of the Rwanda State. This sets apart the Rwandan DDR programme from its regional equivalents, such as those in the DRC<sup>28</sup> and the Republic of South Sudan,<sup>29</sup> where the absence of an appropriate market for ex-combatants (skilled or unskilled) has stymied economic and social reintegration. Positive country conditions have meant that, economically, ex-combatants have been well absorbed into the labour market (to different extents, depending on the classification of ex-combatant)<sup>30</sup> and the positive social environment of reconciliation and peace building.<sup>31</sup>

54. The project continues to receive combatants from the DRC. DDR programming in the DRC consists of the DRC Reinsertion and Reintegration Project (P152903) through which AGs of Rwandan origin are now handled before repatriation via MONUSCO. The most recent assessment of the situation pertaining to AGs of Rwandan origin operating in the DRC states that the FDLR and allied elements "remain a serious threat to civilians in North Kivu. The presence of the FDLR and its clashes with opposing groups has contributed to "an overall deterioration of the security situation and further displacement of the population".<sup>32</sup> However, surrenders by FDLR combatants remain at a "relatively" constant level with 31 FDLR combatants surrendering between June 29<sup>th</sup> and October 6<sup>th</sup> 2016.<sup>33</sup> This is understood to be indicative of how the split in the command structure of the FDLR has not resulted in a surge in surrenders. At the time of writing, MONUSCO is providing assistance to 1322 FDLR combatants and their dependants in transit camps in Kanyabayonga, North Kivu, Walungu, South Kivu and in the DRC government run camp at Kisangani, Tshopo.<sup>34</sup>

55. The parallel programming financed by the GoR, particularly the construction of workshops and houses for disabled ex-combatants and the health infrastructure of the MINISANTE, has been identified in previous Bank reporting as important interventions supporting the overall social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. While falling outside the remit of the project evaluation to assess these particular interventions, it is clear that they contribute to the social and economic integration of ex-combatants and their

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<sup>24</sup>World Bank, 2014 (a): 1.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ishihara, Yoichiro; Bundervoet, Tom; Sanghi, Apurva; Nishiuchi, Toru. 2016. *Rwanda - Economic update: Rwanda at work*. Rwanda economic update; no. 9. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.

<sup>27</sup><http://www.tradingeconomics.com/rwanda/gdp-growth-annual>. Accessed December 15th, 2016.

<sup>28</sup> World Bank, 2012.

<sup>29</sup>Finn, 2014.

<sup>30</sup>Finn, 2015; Finn et al, 2012.

<sup>31</sup>Finn, 2015 and 2015 (a).

<sup>32</sup>UN Security Council (3<sup>rd</sup> October 2016). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 7.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid: 11.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

dependents and to the overall successful reintegration process (to which the SEDRP also contributes). Although omitted from previous evaluations and project documentation, it is also clear that the Rwanda Defence Force Reserve Force (RDFRF) has and will continue to play a role, particularly in economic reintegration. Furthermore, as the SEDRP moves towards its close, the relevance of the Reserve Force to future economic reintegration is becoming increasingly prominent in the RDRC.

56. While there is no independent data, including on the RDRC's or the Rwandan Defence Forces' websites, the RDFRF's operations to construct planned villages (*imidugudu*), including the 'model village' in Batima Cell of the Rweru Sector, as well as the community-based economic operations in forestry and manufacturing are important components of a wider-than-DDR economic and social reintegration approach of the GoR. At the time of writing, the RDFRF's emerging strategy to partner with the Chinese firm C&H to manufacture textiles and to train ex-combatants is another example of its reach in economic reintegration and its capacity to react quickly to changing economic and legislative environments, in this case the plan by the EAC to ban the import of second hand clothing by 2019.

## **1.2. Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators**

57. The PDO of the AF is "to support the efforts of the recipient to: (i) demobilize members of armed groups of Rwandan origin and members of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF); and (ii) provide socio-economic reintegration support to said members following demobilization, with a particular focus on the provision of such support to female, child and disabled ex-combatants".<sup>35</sup>

58. At the time of the original AF the rationale was to meet the costs of scaling up through extending demobilization and reintegration services for additional incoming ex-combatants from AGs repatriating from eastern DRC. It was proposed to add the following to the project:

- (a) Provision of social orientation for dependants of AGs;
- (b) Mental health screening, counselling, treatment, or referral for adult and children ex-combatants; and
- (c) Support to disabled ex-combatants through Integrated Rehabilitation and Production workshops (equipment and training).<sup>36</sup>

59. In order to meet its PDOs, the RDRC will:

- (a) Maintain the capacity required for repatriation, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of returned members of Armed Groups and their dependants;
- (b) Maintain the capacity required for demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of up to 4000 members of the RDF;
- (c) Maintain the capacity required for completion of reintegration activities for up to 4000 members of the RDF;
- (d) Maintain the capacity required for completion of reintegration activities for combatants demobilized in late 2008;
- (e) Ensure that ex-combatants access mainstream services at the national and local levels.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>World Bank, 2014: iv.

<sup>36</sup>World Bank, 2014: 1.

60. The **expected project results** are as follows:

- (a) Increased number of beneficiaries settled in their chosen communities of destination;
- (b) Improved capacity of beneficiaries to advance their own social and economic reintegration;
- (c) Increased access of ex-combatants to support services through central and local government service provision mechanisms (as opposed to through program services).<sup>38</sup>

61. From the perspective of the RDRC, from the second AF the project has been intended to have three broad objectives:<sup>39</sup>

- (a) Demobilize an estimated 5500 members of AGs and 4000 members of the RDF;
- (b) Provide reinsertion support for those demobilized along with approximately 10000 family members of ex-AGs;
- (c) Provide social and economic reintegration assistance to the newly demobilized, as well as up to 400 previous beneficiaries who did not receive support, with emphasis on children and the severely disabled. The project will also seek to mainstream ex-combatant support services within existing government or stakeholder programs.

### **1.3 Intended Main Beneficiaries**

62. During the period under evaluation and as per project documentation, the main intended beneficiaries of the project are:

- (a) RDF ex-combatants (this aspect is complete);
- (b) AG ex-combatants (mainly FDLR);
- (c) The dependants of ex-AGs.

63. Between 2014 and 2015 there were changes made to the project to facilitate direct support to dependants of demobilized ex-combatants. As the quota of RDF ex-combatants had been reached (2013), all direct support to dependants has gone by default to dependants of the FDLR. This support included the following:

- (a) For VSW recipients, the deferral of vocational training to their spouse or nominated dependant;
- (b) For the dependants of ex-AGs, during the reinsertion process dependants receive a Basic Reinsertion Kit (Basic Needs Kit - BNK); and
- (c) For all dependants of demobilized AG's that return to Rwanda with the ex-combatant, they are exposed to a mini-Pre-Discharge Orientation Programme (PDOP). This was introduced in 2014.

### **1.4 Project Components and Outputs as per the AF**

64. The project components and expected outputs are outlined below. *Outputs* are the direct and measurable products of a program's activities or services.

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<sup>37</sup>RDRC, 2015: 7-8.

<sup>38</sup>World Bank, 2009: 7.

<sup>39</sup>RDRC, 2015 (a): 8.

**Project Component: Demobilisation (US\$2,267,600 Allocation, <sup>40</sup>US\$375,550 RDRC Budget 2015, US\$383,275 RDRC Spend 2015). <sup>41</sup>Implemented by RDRC with the assistance of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and MONUSCO)<sup>42</sup>**

65. For the SEDRP the principal activities of the component are:

- (a) General sensitization and counselling regarding civilian life;
- (b) HIV/AIDS voluntary counselling and testing (VCT);
- (c) Socio-economic profiling; and
- (d) Support of basic needs while encamped, including catering services and basic health care.<sup>43</sup>

66. For the RDRC, demobilization is a clear ‘case-load orientated’ process involving close collaboration with the Ministry of Defence (MoD), MONUSCO and, more recently, the PNDDR in the DRC.<sup>44</sup>

67. The objective of the demobilization component is to “reduce the number of RDF military personnel by 4000”<sup>45</sup> and to “demobilize all returning members of ex-armed groups on an on-going basis as and when they return to Rwanda”.<sup>46</sup> Specifically, for the RDF the demobilization consisted of:<sup>47</sup>

- (a) Logistics (such as the RDF returning with equipment); transportation to discharge centres; travel to communities of settlement;
- (b) Screening to ensure adherence to demobilization criteria;
- (c) Discharge.

68. For AGs, the demobilization consists of:<sup>48</sup>

- (a) Disarmament (including separation of child and adult ex-combatant);
- (b) Harmonization of RDRC and MONUSCO data;
- (c) Provision of essential items for the stay of AG ex-combatants in demobilization centres;
- (d) Verification of identification;
- (e) Socio-economic profiling;
- (f) Identification of area of return;
- (g) Allocation of demobilization ID cards and allocation of national ID card numbers;
- (h) Pre-Discharge Orientation Programme (PDOP), which includes socio-economic counselling and sensitisation as well as counselling and VTC on HIV/AIDS;<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>World Bank, 2015: 10.

<sup>41</sup>RDRC, 2015h: 24.

<sup>42</sup>World Bank, 2009; 2014.

<sup>43</sup>World Bank, 2014: iv.

<sup>44</sup>RDRC, 2015: 14-15.

<sup>45</sup>RDRC, 2015: 14.

<sup>46</sup>RDRC, 2015: 14.

<sup>47</sup>RDRC, 2015: 14 – 15.

<sup>48</sup>RDRC, 2015: 15 – 18.

<sup>49</sup> See Annex 5 for additional detail on PDOP activities.

- (i) Medical screening (by the RDRC Medical Rehabilitation Unit (MRU) supported by a GoR-appointed Medical Committee);
- (j) Mental health services (in house at Mutobo);
- (k) Discharge ceremony;
- (l) Transport to community of return.

69. During 2014, 225 ex-AGs (including 1 female and 3 disabled) were demobilized. Of the 225 in total, 102 were afforded medical treatment by the MRU at the Mutobo Demobilization Centre. Of these, 5 ex-combatants were referred to Ruhengeri Hospital, 3 were admitted to local health centres, and 72 were treated at referral hospitals.<sup>50</sup> Regarding psychosocial treatment, 162 ex-combatants were exposed to “psychosocial education”, 222 were individually screened, 25 were screened for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and 6 received psychosocial treatment (psychotherapy).<sup>51</sup> A total of 260 ex-combatants were tested for HIV/AIDS and 4 tested positive (249 by Gataraga Health Centre and 11 by MRU). In total, 61 ex-combatants participated in computer literacy training and 53 completed the training.<sup>52</sup>

70. During 2015<sup>53</sup> the project demobilized 146 AGs of which 4 were female. There were 147 cases of medical treatment at Mutobo with 27 additional referrals to mainstream hospitals and health centres. In total, there were 53 persons exposed to psychosocial education. The project screened 317 male ex-combatants of which 141 were ex-AF and the remainder ex-AG, and screened 30 female ex-combatants of which 24 were ex-AF and the remainder ex-AG. In total, 7 former child combatants were given screening with 6 being referred to Ruhengeri and 1 to Ndera Psychiatric Centre. The project afforded psychosocial counselling to 17 adult dependants of ex-combatants and 8 were diagnosed with varying degrees of PTSD. During 2015 the project screened 35 child dependants of ex-combatants and diagnosed 3 with PTSD and 1 with behavioural issues.

**Project Component: Reinsertion (US\$703,800 Allocation, <sup>54</sup>US\$31,800 RDRC Budget 2015, US\$8,931 Spend (2015). <sup>55</sup>Implemented by RDRC)**

71. For the project, reinsertion encompasses the provision of “special assistance” to “arriving members of armed groups and demobilized soldiers” who have “no source of income”.<sup>56</sup> It includes the services to ex-combatants during the first three-month period from the day of discharge. Activities under the reinsertion component are intended to assist demobilized ex-combatants to meet their basic needs.<sup>57</sup> Support is extended to the dependants of ex-AGs. Specifically, reinsertion activities consist of:

- (a) Basic Needs Kit (BNK), which is given in the form of the cash equivalent to seeds and tools, basic household items, and transport to the community of settlement. Cost per beneficiary is FRW 60,000 (US\$86 approximately<sup>58</sup>);<sup>59</sup>
- (b) Reception (including of dependants);

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<sup>50</sup>RDRC, 2014: 23.

<sup>51</sup>RDRD, 2014: 24.

<sup>52</sup>RDRC, 2014: 26.

<sup>53</sup>RDRC, 2015, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d.

<sup>54</sup>World Bank, 2015: 10.

<sup>55</sup>RDRC, 2015h: 24.

<sup>56</sup>RDRC, 2015: 18.

<sup>57</sup>World Bank, 2014: iv.

<sup>58</sup>Standardized exchange rate of 700:1.

<sup>59</sup>RDRC, 2015: 18.

- (c) Mini-PDOP for dependants of AGs, including health screening and treatment at the demobilization centre, nursery for child dependants, social orientation and provision of national ID card;
- (d) Reinsertion Kit (RK) for dependants of AGs with basic consumables;
- (e) Medical treatment, including in mainstream hospitals with bills paid for 3 months for those found to be seriously ill (*Mutuelles de Santé* should assume payment of bills after three months);
- (f) Transport to communities of return.

72. During Q3 and Q4 2014 the following were the outputs under the reinsertion component:

- (a) BNK: 80, including 25 ex-AG (f), 4 ex-RDF (f), 51 ex-AG (m)<sup>60</sup>
- (b) RK (dependants): 122 (of which 45 in Q3).<sup>61</sup>

73. During 2015 the following were the outputs under thereinsertion component:<sup>62</sup>

- (a) BNK and RSA: 171 male ex-AGs, 1 female ex-AG, 4 female ex-AF
- (b) RK (dependants): 300.

**Project Component: Reintegration (US\$3,292,000 Allocation<sup>63</sup>, US\$748,724 RDRC Budget 2015, US\$575,061 Spend (2015). Implemented by RDRC)<sup>64</sup>**

74. The RDRC observes the long-term nature of the reintegration process and describes the component of the SEDRP as being “aimed at the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into the Rwandan social and economic fabric. As such, it occurs over time rather than through a quick process”.<sup>65</sup>

75. Specifically, for the SEDRP, reintegration activities consist of the process of facilitating the re-incorporation of disenfranchised groups into mainstream society. Programmatically this includes the provision of assistance, such as: micro-project and VSW grants, psychosocial counselling, HIV/AIDS awareness training, community sensitisation, capacity building of cooperatives, reintegration assistance for children and the severely disabled.<sup>66</sup>

76. During Q3 and Q4 2014 the following were themain documented outputs of the reintegration component.<sup>67,68</sup>

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<sup>60</sup>RDRC, 2014: 29.

<sup>61</sup>RDRC, 2014: 31. And RDRC 2014(a) that is the Q3 report: np.

<sup>62</sup>RDRC, 2015.

<sup>63</sup>World Bank, 2015: 10.

<sup>64</sup>RDRC, 2015h: 24.

<sup>65</sup>RDRC, 2015: 22.

<sup>66</sup>World Bank, 2014: iv.

<sup>67</sup>RDRC, 2014: 32f.

<sup>68</sup>As documented in the 2015 evaluation much lower level data on specific outputs is not available. Hence this section highlights the main outputs. See Finn 2015: 11-13 where it was identified that data on RG payments is only available in cumulative totals since 1997, in apparent conflicting totals. Specifically, the finalized payment of RG of January 2009 to December 31<sup>st</sup> 2014 is 8304 (RDRC 2014 final Q4 report page 25). In 2015, the total for January 2009 to December 31<sup>st</sup> 2015 is given as 7721 (RDRC 2015: 36). Support to cooperatives is tracked via the cumulative performance of cooperatives, some in receipt of support from the RDRC in the calendar year others in receipt of support from third parties such as the National Women’s Council, which in 2015 supported the costs of electricity installation for a cooperative in the Southern Province. See RDRC 2015: 37. Similarly, data on individual IGAs. See also RDRC 2015: 40.

- (a) Support to the reintegration of special groups: 61 elderly ex-combatants, 32 former child combatants with 17 assessments in September 2014;
- (b) RG payments;
- (c) Capacity building (to cooperatives) including learning tours: 12 cooperatives with 192 total participants in learning tours for Q4 2014;<sup>69</sup>
- (d) Job placement services (nofinal quantitative data available but estimate by Q4 2015 is 742);<sup>70</sup>
- (e) Additional support to vulnerable groups in the form of vocational training, apprenticeship, formal education and IGA estimated at 315 for VSW 11;<sup>71</sup>
- (f) Rehabilitation and reintegration support to chronically ill and disabled ex-combatants (cumulative by 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2015 to 2989 ex-combatants);
- (g) Services to disabled ex-combatants (cumulative totals - categorization: 2989; receipt of *Mutuelle de Santé*: 2891; and monthly allowance: 2789);<sup>72</sup>
- (h) Medical services: 1177 cumulative total of services in Q4 2014, total by year end 2014 at 12503 ex-combatants. Disaggregation in Q3 was 93 ex-combatants receiving psychosocial assistance, and 14 receiving psychiatric treatment (1 ex-AG, 13 ex-AF) all by 30<sup>th</sup> September 2014;
- (i) Literacy training: 698 ex-combatants graduated (September 2014);
- (j) Medical services to former child combatants: 98 medical complaints in Q4 of which 77 were treated in Muhoza and 12 were referred to Ruhengeri Referral Hospital;
- (k) Literacy support and life skills training to former child combatants: 15 children continued to receive the service in Q4 2014;
- (l) Vocational training to 21 children (completed during Q4 2015).

77. During 2015 the following were the documented main outputs of the reintegration component:<sup>73</sup>

- (a) Psychosocial assistance: 13 ex-AG (m), 7 ex-AG (f), 79 ex-RDF (m), 7 ex-RDF (f), 7 ex-FAR (m), 2 ex-FAR (f);
- (b) Drug and alcohol abuse treatment at Icyizere Centre (identified as ‘psychiatric treatment’):<sup>74</sup> 2 ex-AG (m), 4 ex-RDF (m), 3 ex-RDF (f);
- (c) Facilitated access to shelter (20 vulnerable ex-combatants via ICRC);
- (d) Reintegration Grant (RG): 51 ex-AG (demobilized December 2014);
- (e) Technical Assistance (TA) to Cooperatives: 5 cooperatives (4 Kigali, 1 Eastern Province);
- (f) Job placement of 332 ex-combatants;
- (g) VSW support to 130 ex-combatants during VSW 12, including via vocational training and apprenticeship (60), IGA (68), and formal education (2);
- (h) Medical services: 1398 ex-combatants of 5248 cumulative total by 31<sup>st</sup> December 2015.<sup>75</sup>

**Project Component: Mainstreaming (US\$96,000 Allocation,<sup>76</sup>US\$21,600 RDRC Budget 2015, US\$336 Spend 2015)<sup>77</sup>**

<sup>69</sup>RDRC, 2014d: 26.

<sup>70</sup>RDRC, 2014d: 25 – 27.

<sup>71</sup>RDRC, 2014d: 27.

<sup>72</sup>RDRC, 2014d: 36.

<sup>73</sup> RDRC, 2015: 24-44.

<sup>74</sup>RDRC, 2015 (a): 19.

<sup>75</sup>See Annex 5 for details. Cumulative total at RDRC 2015: 30.

78. The RDRC has identified that mainstreaming is implemented through “knowledge and information sharing with mainstream Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) implementing agencies, through workshops, seminars, meetings and joint activities”.<sup>78</sup>

79. Institutional mainstreaming (essentially the devolution of activities to appropriate government ministries and agencies is “further motivated by a government-wide decentralization effort to devolve the provision of services from central ministries and commissions, such as RDRC, to local authorities”).<sup>79</sup>

80. Mainstreaming constitutes the main pillar of the World Bank’s exit strategy from the SEDRP. Government legislation introduced in 2015 has provided the legal framework for mainstreaming<sup>80</sup> and the appointment of a new Secretary General position in 2015 has increased the emphasis on institutional change for mainstreaming, which includes a new organisational structure for the RDRC.

81. For the SEDRP, mainstreaming includes the mainstreaming of beneficiaries into mainstream services (largely social protection services and medical services) as well as “the preparation, in collaboration with relevant line ministries, of a phasing out strategy to mainstream activities and subcomponents to the various ministries and agencies”.<sup>81</sup>

82. During Q3 and Q4 2014, the following were the documented main outputs of the mainstreaming component:<sup>82</sup>

- (a) Training of staff on gender responsiveness;
- (b) Consultative meetings with relevant stakeholders in the process and beneficiaries;
- (c) Workshop on HIV/AIDS, drug use and psychosocial support;
- (d) Direction of benefits to disabled ex-combatants (Category 1 and 2), including referral to mainstream socio-medical services;
- (e) Sensitisation of Governors and senior representatives in the provinces to the welfare needs of ex-combatants;
- (f) Community sensitisation regarding activities conducted by the RDRC.

83. During 2015, the following were the documented outputs of the mainstreaming component:<sup>83</sup>

- (a) National Conference on Reintegration and Mainstreaming (host);
- (b) National peace tournament;
- (c) On-going liaising with NCC and NAPD;
- (d) On-going sensitisation of cooperatives on mainstream opportunities and frameworks such as the National Employment Program; and

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<sup>76</sup>World Bank, 2015:10.

<sup>77</sup>RDRC, 2015h: 24.

<sup>78</sup>RDRC, 2013 (e): 35.

<sup>79</sup>RDRC 2015: 49.

<sup>80</sup> Draft Law establishing the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) and Determining its Responsibilities, Organization and Functioning (unsigned). Also, Uwizeye, Judith, Minister of Public Service and Labour. *Re: Implementation of the Restructuring of the Public Services Institutions* (correspondence) 1<sup>st</sup> August 2014.

<sup>81</sup>World Bank, 2014: iv-v.

<sup>82</sup>RDRC, 2014 (a): 38f.

<sup>83</sup>RDRC, 2015: 45-46.

- (e) Planning (including for mainstreaming support to cooperatives with NCCR and RICEM).

**Project Component: Program Management (US\$2,051,946 Allocation,<sup>84</sup>US\$443,400 RDRC Budget 2015, US\$428,474 Spend)**

84. The program management component consists of support for decentralized structures; regular project administration of procurement, disbursement, and internal management tasks; extensive monitoring and evaluation of project activities; and on-going support to reinserted ex-combatants to facilitate linkages with appropriate services.

**1.5 Alterations to Original Project Components and Outputs and Justification (World Bank)**

85. The project underwent alterations with the end of the original grant period and the addition of a second period of AF.

86. Specifically:

- (a) Reinsertion component, the addition of provision of social orientation for dependants (mini-PDOP);
- (b) Reintegration component, the addition of (i) mental health screening, counselling, treatment or referral for adult and children ex-combatants and (ii) support to disabled ex-combatants through Integrated Rehabilitation Workshops (equipment and training).

87. The reinsertion component was revised based on “surveys and qualitative research”,<sup>85</sup> which show the importance of the family in the reintegration of ex-combatants and the need to assist returning dependants of AGs to adjust to life in Rwanda. The justification for the changes to the reintegration component by adding mental health supports originates in experience from the project during the lifetime of the original grant plus other “in-depth research on mental health conducted in the region”, which identified the impact of poor mental health on everyday functioning. Certainly research from within the Bank<sup>86</sup> and through external professionals<sup>87</sup> supports this analysis.

88. The justification for the changes to the reintegration component by adding support to disabled ex-combatants is that this cohort of ex-combatants “needs additional support to achieve economic reintegration”<sup>88</sup> and providing equipment and cooperative training to the GoR funded Integrated Rehabilitation Workshops is using “an innovative additional entry point”<sup>89</sup> to support economic reintegration of disabled ex-combatants.

89. Project indicators were revised as outlined above (Section 1.2) in order to “take into account lessons learnt and additional activities”.<sup>90</sup> This is justifiable given the changes to the components and the documented lessons learnt.

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<sup>84</sup>World Bank, 2015: 10.

<sup>85</sup>World Bank, 2014: 3.

<sup>86</sup>Hinkel, 2013.

<sup>87</sup> LOGiCA/Promondo, 2014.

<sup>88</sup>World Bank, 2014: 4.

<sup>89</sup>World Bank, 2014: 4.

<sup>90</sup>World Bank, 2014: 4.

## **2. Performance: PDO, Outcomes and Implementation**

90. The following section is an examination of project *outcomes* at the time of the external independent evaluation. This section of the evaluation includes an examination of the factors found to have influenced the implementation of the project (positive and negative). It addresses aspects of the project design and implementation that fall outside the project components or which straddle more than one of the components.

91. The assessment of outcomes and implementation does not rely solely on documented data but triangulates data from a variety of sources, including consultations and assessments. While the evaluation is restricted to activities from Q3 2014 to Q4 2015 inclusively, the analysis of outcomes includes data on outcomes observed at the time of implementation of the evaluation (Q4 2016).

### **2.1 Progress towards Achievement of PDO and Other Outcomes**

92. This section of the evaluation presents the ratings for the progress towards achievement of PDO; progress towards achievement of outcomes (as per 2014 and 2015 project documentation); and examination of outcomes per component. This section also draws on findings from the 2015 (conducted in 2016) Tracer, PVS and Community Dynamics surveys where appropriate.

93. The project has three outcomes:<sup>91</sup>

- (a) Increased number of beneficiaries settled in their chosen communities;
- (b) Improved capacity of beneficiaries to advance their own social and economic reintegration; and
- (c) Increased access of ex-combatants to social services through central and local government service provision mechanisms (as opposed to through program services).

94. The project outcomes as per the project documentation are not measurable against any particular benchmark or KPI. They identify that the achievement of outcomes is located in 'increasing' settlement, capacity and access. Based on the data supplied by the RDRC and that contained in the Tracer, CDS and PVS it is clear that the project has increased the number of beneficiaries settled in their chosen communities as, in total, 98.4 percent of ex-combatants identify that they freely choose their community of reinsertion.<sup>92</sup>

95. The project has clearly improved the capacity of most beneficiaries to advance their own social and economic reintegration and has done so with sustainable impact. As is discussed below, they are many environmental factors at play in assisting the project to obtain its outcomes.

96. For the first time in the project there are fully comparable Tracer datasets (2015 and 2016) and from the data captured by the surveys it is clear that the project's impacts are plateauing; that is, they have reached a level of outcome that has contributed to raising most ex-combatants who have gone through the project to comparable social and economic performance

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<sup>91</sup>World Bank, 2014: 1.

<sup>92</sup>Source: 2016 PVS Dataset.

levels with civilians. Thus, it can be reasonably argued that the outcomes of the project have transformed into longer term positive impacts on the economic and social wellbeing of ex-combatants.

97. The project is steadily working towards the mainstreaming of services. Arguably, and historically, the most successful increase of access to social services has been through the work of the Medical Rehabilitation Unit with on-going referrals to mainstream hospitals and centres. As is discussed in this document, the challenge to the project is to alleviate the acute pressures on the unit while addressing the chronic pressures via increased access to mainstream services and service supports. How the RDRC has facilitated the vocational and educational training of ex-combatants via mainstream services is also a long established practice in the project, which supports not only the economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants but also the tertiary, further and vocational education third sector in Rwanda.

98. Increasingly, during the evaluation period the language of mainstreaming frames the work of the project up until the time of the implementation of the project evaluation where it is prominent in discussions. Evidence of mainstreaming of ex-combatants includes work in the commission to build functional relationships with other bodies to share the burden of supporting the needs of vulnerable ex-combatants; for example, the National Children's Council. The prominence of the Reserve Force in meeting the current and future economic needs of ex-combatants is also a key example of complementary and parallel economic programming and a mainstream service also open to civilians (even if this does have the outcome of re-militarising ex-combatants who participate). The close link between the RDRC and the RDFRF is evident in the everyday workings of the Commission, including in plans for new economic activities in 2017.

99. The project is limited by the number of social services to which it can link or refer ex-combatants. For example, often in Rwanda the support of most vulnerable groups comes from informal cash transfers from other, better off citizens. This category of 'better off' is relative and includes ex-combatants who too often contribute in cash to the RDRC to allocate payment to *Mutuelle de Santé* for the most vulnerable ex-combatants, as visually verified by the consultancy team during the evaluation period.

100. While ex-combatants (and community members) frequently talk about their role in the assessment of need and vulnerability in the communities and how they are part of the grassroots or community-level distribution of *Mutuelle* and other benefits, this is also, at least at a perceptual level, linked to their role in the Reserve Force.

101. The *mission* of the project is "to support successful demobilisation, social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants in their respective communities so as to realize national security, reconciliation and development. This will be achieved through demobilising ex-combatants and supporting their social and economic reintegration into communities of their own choice for a fresh start."<sup>93</sup>

102. The evaluation confirms the finding of the preceding independent project assessment and concludes that the project remains **likely** to achieve its PDO by the proposed close of the project in December 2017. That said, demand will continue to be present as the trickle-in of ex-combatants and their dependants from the DRC persists.

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<sup>93</sup>RDRC, 2015: 7.

103. At the time of the evaluation the project has supported the GoR to demobilise members of AGs of Rwandan origin and completed the demobilisation of RDF that fell within its purview. The project has supported the GoR to provide a wide variety of socio-economic reintegration supports to demobilised ex-combatants and their dependants and has supported the GoR to focus on female, children and disabled ex-combatants, although as in recent years the numbers of female ex-combatants are low (something that is largely outside the control of the project).

104. The following is the assessment of the performance of the project against its main targets for its PDO, as prescribed in the revised M&E Framework.

**105. Number of demobilized RDF members (disaggregated by gender, ill/disabled). No cumulative target value; target is 'as demanded'.**

106. The evaluation finds that the project has successfully demobilized all RDF members that fell within the purview of the project.

107. In total and according to data provided by the RDRC,<sup>94</sup> between January 2009 and the end of Q1 2015 the project has demobilized 4000 RDF ex-combatants including 4 female ex-combatants and 110 disabled ex-combatants. This is in completion of all eligible RDF demobilisations.

**108. Number of demobilized AG members (disaggregated by gender, child, ill/disabled). No cumulative target. Target is 'as demanded'.**

109. The evaluation finds that the project has successfully demobilized all AGs in line with demand. This finding is presented in recognition that this represents the number of AG documented by the RDRC and that no data has been identified to contradict this or to quantify those refused due to being identified as 'recyclers' or civilians.

110. In total and according to data provided by the RDRC,<sup>95</sup> between January 2009 and the end of Q4 2015 the project has demobilized 4376 AGs including 26 females, 183 former child combatants and 128 disabled ex-combatants.

**111. Percentage of demand for demobilization services met. Target: 100 percent (2013, 2014 and 2015).**

112. In total and according to the data provided by the RDRC, 100 percent of demand has been met.<sup>96</sup> As in previous evaluations, those refused demobilisation services were identified by the RDRC as 're-cyclers', non-Rwandan nationals or civilians seeking benefits. No quantitative data was provided regarding those refused demobilisation. On this basis and data, the evaluation finds that the project has reached its target.

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<sup>94</sup>RDRC, 2015: 11.

<sup>95</sup>RDRC, 2015(d)10 -11.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid.

113. **Percentage of ex-combatants who are economically active (disaggregated by gender, child, ill/disabled).** *This target was subject to revision and gender disaggregation. The target at the time of evaluation is 70 percent (2014 and 2015).*<sup>97</sup>

114. The evaluation finds that the project has successfully reached the target. The evaluation finds that 75.1 percent of ex-combatants are economically active (Table 2). This figure is in comparison to 73.3 percent of civilians.<sup>98</sup>

**Table 1. Percentage of Ex-combatants Economically Active (CDS values)**

Economic status at the listed stages - Currently, main vocational description (based on Q18.1.4)	CDXC 2016	Male	Female	Yes (disabled)	ex-AF	ex-AG	Yes - Former child combatant by demob number
Economically inactive (unemployed, studying, housewife, retired)	24.9	24.8	26.2	34.5	22.8	27.6	24.5
Economically active (employed, self-employed, hustle, subsistence)	75.1	75.2	73.8	65.5	77.2	72.4	75.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
n=	614	553	61	87	342	272	49

Source: 2016 CDS Ex-Combatant Dataset

**Table 2. Percentage of Civilians Economically Active (CDS values)**

Economic status at the listed stages - Currently, main vocational description (based on Q18.1.4)	CDCV 2016	Male	Female	Yes (disabled)	16-29 years (under 30s)
Economically inactive (unemployed, studying, housewife, retired)	26.7	22.4	32.4	39.7	30.2
Economically active (employed, self-employed, hustle, subsistence)	73.3	77.6	67.6	60.3	69.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
n=	424	245	179	63	159

Source: 2016 CDS Civilian Dataset

115. **Percentage of ex-combatants who report social acceptance by their communities (disaggregated by gender, child, ill/disabled).** *This target was subject to a revision in order to exclude reporting by children. Reporting by former child combatants is not affected. The target at the time of evaluation is 80 percent (2015).*

116. The evaluation finds that the project has by and large met its target prescribed in the revised project paper for social acceptance (65 percent) with 62.9 percent of ex-combatants (68.3 percent ex-AF and 56.2 percent ex-AG) reporting that they feel accepted in their immediate community.<sup>99</sup> This compares with 72.0 percent of community members indicating acceptance. Of female ex-combatants, 59.0 percent report that they feel accepted and of disabled ex-combatants 66.7 percent report that they feel accepted. Of former child combatants, 40.9 percent report that they are accepted.

<sup>97</sup>This target remains at 70 percent for 2016. World Bank, 2014: 12.

<sup>98</sup>Source: 2016 CDS dataset.

<sup>99</sup>The data, as asked on the survey forms, broke social acceptance into small extent and great extent. So in order to get the comparative measure with the previous evaluation we present an aggregate value. *Social acceptance* was measured from the ex-combatant to community member survey.

**Table 3. Acceptance (Ex-combatant)**

Q5.8b To what extent do you feel that you are accepted or rejected as part of the community where you live?	CDXC 2016	Male	Female	Yes (disabled)	16-29 years (under 30s)	30-34 years	35-39 years	40 years and over	ex-AF	ex-AG	Yes - Former child combatant by demob number
Rejected	3.3	3.3	3.3	4.6	6.2	4.8	1.4	2.9	1.5	5.5	8.2
Neither accepted nor rejected	33.8	33.4	37.7	28.7	42.7	25.4	35.6	31.9	30.3	38.2	51.0
Accepted to a small extent	8.3	9.1	1.6	9.2	12.5	14.3	9.6	5.2	7.1	9.9	8.2
Accepted to a great extent	54.6	54.3	57.4	57.5	38.5	55.6	53.4	59.9	61.2	46.3	32.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
n=	612	551	61	87	96	63	146	307	340	272	49

Source: 2016 CDS Dataset

**Table 4. Acceptance (Civilian)**

Q5.8 To what extent do you feel that you are accepted or rejected as part of the community where you live?	CDCV 2016	Male	Female	Yes (disabled)	16-29 years (under 30s)	30-34 years	35-39 years	40 years andover
Rejected	2.2	1.2	3.5	1.6	2.6	1.8	5.1	1.2
Neither accepted nor rejected	33.3	32.6	34.3	38.1	38.7	35.1	25.6	29.6
Accepted to a small extent	8.0	7.4	8.7	11.1	8.4	10.5	5.1	7.4
Accepted to a great extent	56.5	58.7	53.5	49.2	50.3	52.6	64.1	61.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
n=	414	242	172	63	155	57	39	162

Source: 2016 CDS Dataset

117. **Number of direct project beneficiaries disaggregated by gender. This is identified as ‘continued’ for the second AF. However, the indicator is not included in the results framework for the original grant. No target is set for the second AF.**

118. According to data provided by the RDRC, the project has the following breakdown of direct project beneficiaries by the 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2015: 30 female ex-combatants and 8346 male ex-combatants, of which 238 are disabled.<sup>100</sup>

## 2.2 Component: Demobilisation

119. Demobilisation in the SEDRP targets both ex-combatants and their dependants and, in doing so, lays the foundation for reintegration.

120. The target for the component is **the percentage of demobilized persons who are satisfied with the services and information provided in the demobilization centres. The target remained unchanged for the second AF. The target at the time of evaluation is 80 percent.**

121. The evaluation finds that the project has failed to meet the target as it is prescribed in the revised M&E Framework. Specifically, 73.1 percent of ex-combatants indicate that they are satisfied with the Demobilisation Centre, with 17.5 indicating that they were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (neutral response).

122. However, based on the overall analysis of time spent at the centres and ex-combatant feedback on satisfaction with specific services, the evaluation recommends that, while there are

<sup>100</sup>RDRC, 2015d: 10.

areas for improvement, the project could be considered to have satisfactorily performed in this regard.

**Table 5. Satisfaction with Demobilisation Centres (Adult ex-combatants)**

Q4.3 Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the Demobilisation Centre activities?	PVS 2016 (July 2014-December 2015 SEDRP)	Male	Female	Yes (disabled)	16-29 years (under 30s)	30-34 years	35-39 years	40 years and over	ex-AF	ex-AG
Dissatisfied	9.4	9.6	0.0	20.8	2.5	5.3	15.2	11.2	14.7	8.5
Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied	17.5	17.4	25.0	12.5	12.5	23.7	19.6	16.3	20.6	16.9
Satisfied	73.1	73.1	75.0	66.7	85.0	71.1	65.2	72.4	64.7	74.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=	223	219	4	24	40	38	46	98	34	189

Source: 2016 PVS Dataset

123. This finding is based on multiple variables in the 2016 PVS and not on a single variable, asking whether or not ex-combatants were satisfied with the services and information provided in the demobilization centre. While at a composite level 73.1 percent of ex-combatants indicated satisfaction, 88.8 percent indicated satisfaction with the PDOP and 82.6 percent indicated satisfaction with training received while at the centre.

124. Comments in the project paper note that the project expected the profile of demobilizing ex-combatants to change with an increased proportion of forced demobilization, which in turn was anticipated to negatively impact on satisfaction rates. The 2016 surveys did not target whether repatriation was voluntary or forced, but during the implementation of the studies the teams did not encounter any proportion of ex-combatants indicating that they had been forced to return.

125. The studies identified data that could be interpreted as indicating how some ex-combatants believe mainstream service should be more readily and comprehensively available on site in the centres run by the RDRC. Arguably, this is not an indication of unhappiness with the quality of services but rather a reflection of unhappiness with the accessibility of particular mainstream services.

126. For example, when surveyed regarding the kinds of service improvements that they would like at the centres, adult<sup>101</sup> ex-combatants responded that the three areas where they most felt there could be improvements were: medical care (26.4 percent), travel to location for settlement (20.4 percent), and identification of where one will resettle or relocate (19.7 percent).

**Table 6. Services for Improvement**

What, amongst the listed services at the demobilisation centre, do you suggest can be improve?		PVS 2016 (July 2014-December 2015 SEDRP)	Male	Female	Yes (disabled)	16-29 years (under 30s)	30-34 years	35-39 years	40 years and over	ex-AF	ex-AG
Q4.4.1 Medical care	Yes	26.4	26.4	25.0	39.3	27.3	35.0	23.4	23.3	29.8	25.5
	N=	235	231	4	28	44	40	47	103	47	188
Q4.4.2 Psychological counselling	Yes	16.0	15.8	25.0	23.3	11.4	25.0	14.3	14.4	18.8	15.3
	N=	238	234	4	30	44	40	49	104	48	190

<sup>101</sup>Former child combatants were surveyed separately. There is a statistically insufficient number of former child combatants in the 2016 PVS.

Q4.4.3 Career guidance	Yes	15.1	15.0	25.0	20.0	13.6	17.5	16.3	14.4	20.8	13.7
	N=	238	234	4	30	44	40	49	104	48	190
Q4.4.4 Reproductive or sexual health care services	Yes	17.7	17.6	25.0	23.3	13.6	30.0	14.6	16.3	27.1	15.3
	N=	237	233	4	30	44	40	48	104	48	189
Q4.4.5 Socio-economic profiling	Yes	18.8	19.1	0.0	16.7	15.9	26.8	16.3	18.3	29.2	16.2
	N=	239	235	4	30	44	41	49	104	48	191
Q4.4.6 Identification of where you will resettle or relocate	Yes	19.7	20.0	0.0	20.0	25.6	26.8	12.2	18.1	27.1	17.8
	N=	239	235	4	30	43	41	49	105	48	191
Q4.4.7 Issuing RDRP ID card	Yes	16.2	16.5	0.0	20.0	15.9	19.5	12.2	17.1	18.8	15.6
	N=	240	236	4	30	44	41	49	105	48	192
Q4.4.8 Medical Screening	Yes	19.0	19.3	0.0	23.3	18.2	17.1	14.6	22.3	29.2	16.4
	N=	237	233	4	30	44	41	48	103	48	189
Q4.4.9 Mental Health Services	Yes	14.8	15.1	0.0	14.3	14.0	17.1	12.5	15.5	19.1	13.8
	N=	236	232	4	28	43	41	48	103	47	189
Q4.4.10 Discharge ceremony	Yes	10.4	10.6	0.0	10.0	9.1	12.2	8.2	11.4	10.4	10.4
	N=	240	236	4	30	44	41	49	105	48	192
Q4.4.11 Travel to location for resettlement	Yes	20.4	20.3	25.0	20.0	13.6	19.5	22.4	22.9	29.2	18.2
	N=	240	236	4	30	44	41	49	105	48	192

Source: 2016 PVS Dataset

### 2.3 Component: Reinsertion

127. At the time of the independent evaluation, the performance of the project in relation to the achievement of the targets is as follows.

128. **Number of ex-combatants who have received reinsertion benefits (BNK, RSA) in time and in accordance with the implementation manual (PIM).***The target at the time of evaluation is 95 percent. There is no RSA in 2016 assessments.*

129. The evaluation finds that the project has successfully achieved the target for 2016 with 98.0 percent of eligible ex-combatants indicating that they received the BNK.<sup>102</sup> Of those who received the BNK, 72.5 percent received it on the day of discharge and 27.5 percent after the day of discharge. Of those who received the BNK after the day of discharge, 45.5 percent indicated that they received it within the 30-day window and 54.5 indicated that they received it outside the 30-day window.

130. **Number of reinsertion kits delivered to dependants of ex-AG members.***No target set.*

131. The evaluation finds that the project has delivered THKs to 94.8 percent of eligible dependants of ex-combatants.<sup>103</sup> Of those whose families received the THK, 95.6 percent received it on discharge day.

132. **Percentage of ex-combatants who settled down in their community of choice (with access to shelter and food security).***The target at the time of evaluation is 95 percent.*

133. The evaluation finds that the project has successfully met its target at the time of evaluation with 98.4 percent of respondents identifying that they had freely chosen their community of reinsertion.<sup>104</sup> Furthermore, the reasons given for choosing the place of resettlement

<sup>102</sup>Source: 2016 PVS dataset.

<sup>103</sup>Source: 2016 PVS dataset.

<sup>104</sup>Source: 2016 PVS dataset.

were: family (85.9 percent), economic reasons (47.5 percent), safety and security (35.7 percent) and education opportunities (8.0 percent).<sup>105</sup> Access to food and shelter was not measured.

## 2.4 Component: Reintegration

134. At the time of the independent evaluation, the performance of the project in the achievement of planned outcomes of the reintegration component is as follows.

135. **Number of ex-combatants who received reintegration benefits (RG) in time and in accordance with the implementation manual. No target set. Revised PIM indicates payments should be made within three months of discharge.**

136. The evaluation finds that 92.4 percent of eligible ex-combatants received the RG, of which 87.5 percent received the payment within three months after their return to their community of choice. Of those who indicated that they received a late payment (n20), n6 indicated three weeks late, n4 indicated one week late, and n3 indicated four weeks late. These are statistically insignificant frequencies.

137. Regarding satisfaction with RG, 71.4 percent of ex-combatants indicated that they were satisfied with the payment, and 15.8 percent neither dissatisfied nor satisfied. In total, 87.1 percent of respondents indicated that they had the freedom to independently choose the reintegration option they wanted and 91.0 percent indicated their choice was an informed one. Of those who indicated that they received RG, 93.2 percent indicated that they received business development advice prior to using their RG and 83.4 percent indicated that they were satisfied with the advice (13.4 percent neither dissatisfied nor satisfied).

138. Between 55.7 percent and 62.6 percent indicated that they would make the same choice again when asked to consider whether, if they could, they would re-make the choice of reintegration option today given what they now know about how their life circumstances have evolved, how the local economy is and how their community is. The following are the uses indicated regarding the use of RG (Table 8).

**Table 7. Choice of RG Options**

What reintegration option did you choose? Proportion of respondents that indicated 'yes'	PVS2016	PVS 2016 (July 2014-December 2015 SEDRP)	Male	Female	Yes (disabled)	ex-AF	ex-AG
Q15.17.1 Children's education	Yes	11.1	10.8	33.3	9.1	19.6	8.6
	N=	225	222	3	33	51	174
Q15.17.2 Formal education	Yes	6.7	6.8	0.0	9.1	13.7	4.6
	N=	225	222	3	33	51	174
Q15.17.3 Scholarships	Yes	7.1	7.2	0.0	3.0	9.8	6.3
	N=	225	222	3	33	51	174
Q15.17.4 Housing	Yes	22.6	22.4	33.3	15.2	23.5	22.3
	N=	226	223	3	33	51	175
Q15.17.5 Tools	Yes	17.4	17.2	33.3	18.2	15.7	17.9
	N=	224	221	3	33	51	173
Q15.17.6 Employment	Yes	9.8	10.0	0.0	6.1	11.8	9.2
	N=	224	221	3	33	51	173
Q15.17.7 Agricultural income generating activities	Yes	29.5	29.5	33.3	15.2	17.6	33.0
	N=	227	224	3	33	51	176
Q15.17.8 Non-farm	Yes	29.2	29.1	33.3	24.2	21.6	31.4

<sup>105</sup>Source: 2016 PVS dataset. Multiple responses permitted.

income generating activities	N=	226	223	3	33	51	175
Q15.17.9 Income generating activities in general	Yes	26.0	25.9	33.3	33.3	23.5	26.7
	N=	227	224	3	33	51	176
Q15.17.10 Vocational and apprenticeship training	Yes	16.7	17.0	0.0	12.1	15.7	17.0
	N=	227	224	3	33	51	176

Source: 2016 PVS Dataset

139. The largest proportion (45.5 percent) of PVS respondents used their RG on crop farming and 20.6 percent used it on livestock farming. Of those respondents who received RG, 66.0 percent attended RDRC sponsored training on cooperatives, entrepreneurship and project preparation and management, 46.9 percent attended a learning tour and 47.8 percent received technical assistance or coaching.

**140. Percentage of ex-combatants selected to receive VSW support and registered to receive training that has successfully completed training/education. Target 90 percent. This is an adjusted target revised “to reflect improvement in provision of benefits.”<sup>106</sup>**

141. Due to routing in the 2016 PVS it is challenging to independently verify the performance of the project in this regard. The RDRC reports that 100 percent completed the relevant support activities in line with benefits to vulnerable ex-combatants.<sup>107</sup>

142. The 2016 PVS identifies that 65.9 percent of ex-combatants used their VSW for skills training (50.0 percent of ex-AF, 70.8 percent of ex-AG, and 35.7 percent of disabled combatants). Also, 25.9 percent used the VSW support for an IGA with two weeks of training (40.0 percent of ex-AF, 21.5 percent of ex-AG, and 50.0 percent of disabled ex-combatants). Finally, 8.2 percent used it for formal education (10.0 percent of ex-AF, 7.7 percent of ex-AG and 14.3 percent of disabled ex-combatants).

143. If one uses a satisfaction criterion to indicate success, then 84.2 percent of the VSW respondents were satisfied (successful) with the training and of the n7 who received formal education n4 were satisfied with the support.

**144. Percentage of incoming ex-combatants who are screened for mental health issues (disaggregated by adult and children). Target 75 percent.**

145. The evaluation finds that 67.5 percent of adult ex-combatants were screened for mental health issues while in the demobilisation centre. There is a statistically insignificant proportion of former child combatants to conduct adult/child disaggregation. However, of the youth (16-30 years) cohort there is statistical parity with the overall proportion (66.7 percent). While the project failed to reach its target as prescribed in the M&E Framework, it should be noted that 71.8 percent of dependants received mental health screening and 96.3 percent of ex-combatants received medical screening. It is therefore likely that the failure to reach the target in mental health screening is related to the on-going capacity challenges at the Medical Rehabilitation Unit (outlined below).

<sup>106</sup>World Bank, 2014: 21.

<sup>107</sup>RDRC, 2015d: 28.

## 2.5 Component: Mainstreaming

146. The outcomes of the mainstreaming component are as follows at the time of the independent evaluation.

147. **Percentage of categorized disabled ex-combatants who received *Mutuelles de Santé* and Monthly Allowance as per current legislation and within 9 months after demobilization. Target is 95 percent.**

148. The evaluation finds that, regarding access to *Mutuelles de Santé* for disabled ex-combatants, the project has failed to reach the 2016 target. The evaluation finds that, of the cohort of disabled ex-combatants, 78.9 percent have *Mutuelles de Santé*. This differs from the ex-combatant survey whereby 87.1 percent of disabled ex-combatants have cover and from the Tracer whereby 80.0 percent have cover. Of the same overall cohort, 64.7 percent (n34) received their Monthly Allowance, of which 71.4 (n21) percent did so within the 9-month timeframe.

149. There is significant correlation between whether an ex-combatant has *Mutuelles de Santé* and the year of demobilisation. It appears that the more recently demobilised respondents have a lower allocation/uptake than those demobilised prior to 2014. Amongst those ex-combatants who have *Mutuelles de Santé*, 45.7 percent were demobilised in 2014 – 2016. Amongst those who do not have *Mutuelles de Santé*, 77.1 percent were demobilised 2014-2016.

**Table 8. *Mutuelle de Santé* Crosstabulation with Year of Demobilisation**

		Q2.8 Do you have <i>Mutuelles de Santé</i> ?					
		Yes		No		Total	
		Q10.1 Do you have any disability?		Q10.1 Do you have any disability?		Q10.1 Do you have any disability?	
		Disabled	Able-bodied	Disabled	Able-bodied	Disabled	Able-bodied
Q1.9 In what year were you demobilised?	1997	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%
	2000	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%
	2001	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.3%	0.0%	0.5%
	2002	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%
	2003	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	1.3%	0.0%	0.9%
	2006	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%
	2007	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%
	2009	0.0%	12.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%
	2010	3.3%	7.0%	0.0%	1.3%	2.6%	5.0%
	2011	0.0%	1.4%	12.5%	0.0%	2.6%	0.9%
	2012	0.0%	5.6%	0.0%	1.3%	0.0%	4.1%
	2013	76.7%	18.2%	37.5%	14.7%	68.4%	17.0%
	2014	10.0%	25.2%	12.5%	28.0%	10.5%	26.1%
	2015	10.0%	16.1%	25.0%	30.7%	13.2%	21.1%
2016	0.0%	9.8%	12.5%	21.3%	2.6%	13.8%	
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
		30	143	8	75	38	218
Q1.9z In what year were you demobilised?	1997-2008	0.0%	4.2%	0.0%	2.7%	0.0%	3.7%
	2009-2013	80.0%	44.8%	50.0%	17.3%	73.7%	35.3%
	2014-2016	20.0%	51.0%	50.0%	80.0%	26.3%	61.0%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		30	143	8	75	38	218

Source: 2016 PVS Dataset

150. However, regarding the reasons why an ex-combatant does not have *Mutuelles de Santé* there is limited indication that for recent demobilisations the benefit is ‘in process’ (Table 10).

**Table 9. Reasons for Not Having *Mutuelle de Santé* Crosstabulation with Year of Demobilisation**

			Q1.9z In what year were you demobilised?			Total
			1997-2008	2009-2013	2014-2016	
Q2.9 If no, then why do you not have any <i>Mutuelles de Santé</i> cover?	In process, or still planning, to apply for <i>Mutuelles de Santé</i> cover	Count	0	1	8	9
		% within Q1.9z In what year were you demobilised?	0.0%	5.9%	13.6%	11.5%
	Inability to pay for <i>Mutuelles de Santé</i> cover	Count	2	12	36	50
		% within Q1.9z In what year were you demobilised?	100.0%	70.6%	61.0%	64.1%
	Not <i>Ubudehe</i> compliant i.e. no <i>Ubudehe</i> category, does not qualify for a <i>Ubudehe</i> category	Count	0	0	13	13
		% within Q1.9z In what year were you demobilised?	0.0%	0.0%	22.0%	16.7%
Obstacles to registration i.e. not on list, no facilities, not filled	Count	0	2	1	3	
	% within Q1.9z In what year were you demobilised?	0.0%	11.8%	1.7%	3.8%	
Other type of insurance	Count	0	2	1	3	
	% within Q1.9z In what year were you demobilised?	0.0%	11.8%	1.7%	3.8%	
Total	Count	2	17	59	78	
	% within Q1.9z In what year were you demobilised?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Source: 2016 PVS Dataset

151. **Percentage of ex-combatants that received national ID cards prior to leaving the demobilisation centre. Target is 90 percent.**

152. The evaluation finds that 90.1 percent of ex-combatants received the national ID at the demobilisation centre. Recognising the centrality of national IDs to many everyday processes (such as obtaining a phone with airtime) the RDRC has proactively pushed back the allocation of ID cards to earlier in the demobilisation process. Theoretically, this will also improve the tracking of ex-combatants and improve the accuracy of the RDRC's MIS.

## 2.6 Summary: Factors Affecting Achievement of Outcomes

153. Following is a discussion of the factors that have positively and negatively affected the achievement of outcomes for the project. Also, there is a discussion of emerging challenges, particularly in relation to mainstreaming, that in the next fiscal year and into the post-project phase may impact on the sustainability of outcomes.

154. In the following section there is occasional reference made to the institutional arrangements of the RDRC (in relation to other social protection agencies and line ministries) and to the apparent capacity limitations at the RDRC as they affect the work with vulnerable sub-groups, particularly former child combatants and those with mental health challenges. The evaluation notes that these observations are made in the context of the performance of the project and the evaluation does not include an audit of the organisational capacity or structure of the

RDRC. In addition, the evaluation places these findings in the context of the evolving institutional change in the RDRC as the project approaches its closure.

155. In summary, the factors affecting the implementation and outcomes of the project can be broadly grouped as follows. The main factors **positively** affecting the project outcomes are:

- (a) Generally positive country context, particularly economic growth and poverty alleviation;
- (b) Mainstreaming and alignment with non-project activities; and
- (c) Buy-in from the GoR.

156. The main factors **negatively** affecting the project outcomes are:

- (a) Broad set of factors mitigating against the planned-for and prioritised return of ex-AGs from the DRC;
- (b) Limitations on services to mental health cases and in follow-up to former child combatants; and
- (c) On-going challenges regarding M&E, information centralisation and collation, particularly concerning the data of ex-combatants.

157. The main factors that are currently presenting, or may in future present, challenges to the sustainability of the project outcomes are:

- (a) In the context of mainstreaming, ensuring prioritization of the work of the Commission within government, including government budget lines, and in the understanding of local authorities;
- (b) Clear need for long-term increased resources in resource intensive sectors, particularly mental health;
- (c) Managing institutional change; and
- (d) Ensuring the sustainability of the Centre of Excellence in DDR in Mutobo.

158. Regarding those factors **positively** influencing the achievement of the project outcomes, the following are the observations of the evaluation.

159. **Positive country context, particularly in economic growth.** The success of the reintegration programming, both economic and social, is significantly influenced by the economic success of ex-combatants. In cases where there is a lack of economic opportunities (sometimes exacerbating the negative effects of when a programme fails to have a lack of realistic market assessments, as is sometimes seen in DDR programming in the region) ex-combatants, communities and programme implementers encounter a critical barrier to successful outcomes. The absorptive capacity of local, national or regional markets is critical to facilitating the return of former combatants to economic productivity.

160. Based on data in the CDS ex-combatant and community member databases, ex-combatants in general have a level of economic activity similar to civilians.<sup>108</sup> It is evident that the social and economic skills with which many ex-combatants have been equipped through the project have enhanced their capacity to reintegrate economically.<sup>109</sup> However, as is always the issue,

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<sup>108</sup>See 2016 CDS. See also 2014/2016 Tracer datasets and 2014 CDS.

<sup>109</sup>Finn et al, 2013.

the critical absorptive capacity of the market (in targeted employment/IGA and in subsequent choices) is an important factor, assisting economic reintegration and enabling ex-combatants to be mobile in the job market. That said, the duration of skilling in vocation centres, the support to form economic cooperatives, and particularly the reported success of such initiatives such as job placement with government agencies, and the economic impact of recruitment to the Reserve Force have assisted the project in performing well regarding the economic reintegration of ex-combatants. Similarly, the comprehensive and well-tailored training syllabus at Mutobo<sup>110</sup> orientates ex-combatants for IGAs or employment where available. It is notable that instructors in Mutobo, particularly in agriculture, specifically tailor instruction to the different locations and local conditions where ex-combatants have indicated they would like to settle. Subtle nuances such as this increase the effectiveness of training and the likelihood of success for ex-combatants.

161. Rwanda has “delivered economic growth, [experienced] a significant decline in poverty, and a reduction in inequality”.<sup>111</sup> Rwanda’s remarkable economic growth and its progress in poverty reduction and social inclusion create a strong pull for ex-combatants into the labour market and towards an economy increasingly more orientated towards incorporating functional social protection mechanisms. An indicator of this is the project to conduct vulnerability categorisation of all Rwandans being implemented via MINALOC. In reality, informal social protection payments to highly vulnerable community members are solicited from other community members in place of a social welfare payment system. The RDRC’s work to ensure that vulnerable ex-combatants have *Mutuelle de Santé* is a manifestation of an institutional response to vulnerability as per the project objectives, and this is complemented by contributions by ex-combatants themselves. During the current evaluation period, the evaluation saw bulk cash payments made to the RDRC by ex-combatants in order to finance *Mutuelle de Santé* for vulnerable ex-combatants. One particular payment of Rwf 150,000 was accompanied by the submitting ex-combatant’s demobilisation name, number and contact details in an envelope marked “*To support ex-combatants(Kugura Mutuel)*”.<sup>112</sup>

162. Some qualification arises when considering recent demobilisations. Many have moved outside of Rwanda (a positive indicator of freedom of movement in the EAC) to seek economic opportunities in neighbouring countries, particularly those ex-combatants who chose to resettle in the Eastern Province. Specifically, the 2016 PVS found that, among the provinces, the largest non-response rate was in the Eastern Province where the non-response rate was 63.6 percent. Of this, ex-AGs had a far higher non-response rate than ex-AFs (72.6 percent compared to 38.5 percent). Intelligence, including that acquired through networks of key stakeholders (along with no evidence of social tension as a driver of migration in the 2016 CDS), indicates that these ex-AGs are largely in Uganda and Tanzania and have migrated for economic reasons. Issues such as (i) lack of economic opportunity in the Eastern Province, (ii) the cost differentiation between renting land for agriculture in Rwanda vs. elsewhere in the EAC, and (iii) freedom of movement in the EAC contribute to high migration. The project should consider how to better analyse and understand the dynamics at play for ex-AGs in the Eastern Province.

163. **Alignment of the project with the social inclusion priorities of the GoR and institutionally under MINALOC and cooperation with other ministries.** As reinforced by the gradual move towards mainstreaming, because the RDRC sits within MINALOC the alignment

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<sup>110</sup>See Annex 2.

<sup>111</sup>World Bank, 2014 (a): 1.

<sup>112</sup>See December 6<sup>th</sup> 2016. Photographed by the team.

of the project under the social inclusion priorities of the GoR is a cross-cutting theme supporting project effectiveness in a variety of components and sub-components.

164. The project is specifically enhanced by virtue of its implementation through the RDRC and its alignment with, and relevance to, social and economic policies such as EDPRS 2 and Vision 2020. The RDRC, as the implementing social protection agency for ex-combatants, realises via programming the policy and strategy formulated by MINALOC. It is part of the sector working group and along with the DGs of MINALOC and FARG, NCPD and LODA holds weekly coordination meetings to align the work of all agencies and to inform the development of social protection under the ministry.

165. As such, the project benefits from the RDRC's position in relation to MINALOC and the other social protection agencies. It is part of what appears to be a coherent and collaborative nascent social protection sector. The subsidiary effects of RDRC's work on overall social protection and social cohesion are likely to be positively enhanced through coordination and collaboration with the ministry and the other partner agencies.

166. As is seen below, a major challenge for the RDRC in the future is ensuring that, as the project closes, the needs of ex-combatants, particularly the most vulnerable, receive priority within the centralised budgeting processes. At the time of writing the RDRC has already begun negotiations on this for the following financial year.

167. Similarly, the RDRC should consider further sensitisation of local authorities on the need to ensure that vulnerable ex-combatants have access to mainstream support for vulnerable people.

168. The 2016 CDS notes that regarding access to social services via central government or regional public service offices there is no statistically significant distinction between ex-combatants and civilians (85.3 percent compared to 91.5 percent) and little distinction within the strata respective populations. The main barrier ex-combatants identify is that local authorities say that the RDRC is responsible for vulnerable ex-combatants and not the mainstream services. This is supported by much qualitative testimony, including the following.

R4. No one else, even the local leaders give us [economic] support ... it does not reach us because they think we are supported by the RDRC.

R1. It is their mind-set. They said 'when you are demobilised the RDRC helps you and the government [mainstream services] is for civilians.

R7. I asked our village leaders responsible to add me on the list of *Girinka*<sup>113</sup> beneficiaries and he responded that I'm not in a position to be supported because I'm demobilised and in all villages in Rwanda there is that programme. That is the mind-set of our leaders.

*Source: Female ex-combatant, FGD, Gasabo.*

R3. Our life is difficult because when we seek help from the authorities they tell us we are being helped by the Commission so our challenges cannot be addressed.

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<sup>113</sup>Government run 'Own a Cow' programme.

*Source: FGD Male ex-combatants (ex-AF), Mukarange Kayonza.*

169. The RDRC should be aware of this issue and use the final year of the programme to increase the sensitisation of local authorities on mainstreaming and the responsibilities of mainstream services.

170. The implementation of the project has also benefited from the role of other line ministries particularly MINADEF. The impact of MINADEF via the Reserve Force is difficult to quantify and to date, and in the best knowledge of the evaluation team, the extent to which ex-combatants are project beneficiaries and members of the Reserve Force has not been measured by an external team. The extent to which ex-combatants beneficiaries of the SEDRP re-enlist along with community members in this reserve military force is unknown. The benefits to the ex-combatant or civilian are participation in economic activities and, for some ex-combatants, re-deployment largely via UN missions in the region.

171. In older DDR programmes, re-enlistment can be identified as both a failure in the programme and a success. For example, the Sierra Leone DDR programme is cited as failing youth ex-combatants by virtue of how they were permitted to be re-enlisted (or even forced to re-enlist for economic reasons) following the completion of the programme.<sup>114</sup> The same DDR programme (phase 1, September to December 1998) is cited as failing partially as a result of ECOMOG's failure to provide security-allowed remobilisation and armament of factions.<sup>115</sup>

172. In Rwanda there is clearly not a re-armament of factions but the Reserve Force remains a security instrument with apparent economic and social benefits. This is emphasised by plans to run a re-registration of former child combatants who up until now have not been eligible to joining the Force (something that has been communicated by former child combatants to the evaluation team as a grievance). Post-SEDRP the Reserve Force will take on further prominence in the RDRC not least through emerging plans for textile manufacturing.

173. **Buy-in from the GoR.** The project remains a beneficiary of buy-in and commitment from the GoR, which builds on the alignment of DDR programming under the broad social protection sector (as discussed above and in the previous evaluation) and orientates the RDRC for mainstreaming. The project has been structurally supported by the GoR and through government financial commitment and borrowing under the current financing agreement, which ensures the running of the RDRC and to implement complementary activities to SEDRP, including constructing homes for eligible disabled ex-combatants, Integrated Rehabilitation Workshops and, of course, the complementary activities of the Reserve Force.

174. The previous evaluation identified that the level of buy-in from the GoR was captured in the commitment to finance the RDRC post-SEDRP and through the creation of the legal framework for such continuation (the Law 'Establishing the Rwanda Demobilization Commission (RDRC) and Determining its Responsibilities, Organisation and Functioning')<sup>116</sup>, which includes a new organisational structure for the RDRC and salary scales as communicated to the RDRC by the Ministry of Public Service and Labour in correspondence dated August 6<sup>th</sup>, 2014.<sup>117</sup> This remains the framework for the evolution of the RDRC over the next 12 months. However, as is

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<sup>114</sup>Peters and Peters, 1998: 187.

<sup>115</sup> Solomon and Ginifer, 2008: 8-9.

<sup>116</sup>GoR, 2014.

<sup>117</sup>MIFOTRA, 2014 (Correspondence).

discussed below, greater institutional effort should be applied to plan the transition and institutional change process.

175. Regarding those factors negatively influencing the achievement of the project outcomes, the following are the findings of the evaluation.

176. **It remains the case that, arguably, the most significant factor or set of factors influencing negatively the performance of the project are those preventing the return of ex-AGs from the DRC to the extent that the project has repeatedly anticipated.** Throughout the Bank project documentation the return of FDLR is the overriding logic to extend the project. It remains the case that the rate of return has been much lower and more gradual than anticipated. It is likely that this trickle-in will continue after the close of the project.

177. The factors against the planned and prioritised return of ex-AGs from the DRC are all largely outside the control of the project. As long as regional insecurity persists, particularly in the form of the stuttering stabilisation of the DRC, mass demobilisation of the FDLR will not occur. The deadline for mass surrender passed during the period under review (2<sup>nd</sup> January 2015) and, as outlined above, the FDLR continue to prove a strong destabilising presence in the Kivus. As of May 2016 it was reported that, in addition to the between 2000 and 5000 FDLR active in the DRC, there were 314 FDLR in the Kanyabayonga camp with their dependants, 202 with their dependants in Walungu, and 806 in a camp in Kisangani awaiting repatriation.<sup>118</sup>

178. Anecdotally, recently repatriated combatants shared accounts of their voluntary surrender to MONUSCO and all emphasised the difficulty and danger they encountered when attempting to reach the safety of MONUSCO. Accounts of former FDLR being seized by FARDC while in transit to the Rwandan border with MONUSCO are known to ex-combatants and to the RDRC staff in the field, the same staff who often have long experience of life in the DRC. Ex-combatants stressed repeatedly the need for MONUSCO to have a more proactive role in facilitating escape, although what that would amount to is unclear. Suggestions raised included providing more accessible safe corridors to MONUSCO camps and deeper operations in areas with FDLR.

179. From the volume of FDLR awaiting repatriation it is clear that demand for DDR services in Rwanda should persist into the future. What is also clear from the personal accounts of recently demobilised ex-combatants is that not only is surrender highly risky but the profile of those surrendering includes combatants who may never have seen Rwanda or who may have left Rwanda as a young child, so they do not have any real experience of Rwanda. This last point emphasises the need for the communications strategy of the RDRC to continue to reach to conditions on the ground in the DRC, and in partnership with MONUSCO, to find ways to maintain effectiveness and manage challenges, such as those presented by repeated technology failure on the DRC side during peer-to-peer Skype sessions or telephone calls.

180. **Limitations, either through human capacity or other factors, on services provided to some vulnerable groups, particularly former child combatants.** The project has a focus on vulnerable groups. The previous independent evaluation<sup>119</sup> observed that the project was

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<sup>118</sup> <http://www.theeastafrikan.co.ke/news/Monusco-and-Kinshasa-forces-go-after-FDLR-militia/2558-3223046-h9ffrp/index.html>. Accessed December 1st, 2016.

<sup>119</sup>Finn, 2014.

hampered by capacity issues when working with two vulnerable groups: former child combatants and those with mental health challenges. In that evaluation, staff churns and reassignments was identified as one barrier to working more effectively with former child combatants. Particularly in how it limited the ability of the project to implement appropriate follow-up and monitoring and to assist adequately in the social and economic reintegration of this cohort of ex-combatants. It was observed that former child combatants were largely without systematic follow-up by the project or by other agencies in the arena, such as the ICRC and this was validated through interviews in the RDRC and in the ICRC

181. Since then, and within the period under evaluation, the RDRC has appointed a new Child Welfare Officer, implemented the mentorship programme (that was in pilot form in 2014) and, during the 2016 calendar year, conducted one sensitisation and outreach session reaching 118 former child combatants (of 263 targeted). Despite this, follow-up with child combatants remains a challenge not least because of the difficulties tracing some of the cohort that come through Muhoza, but also because of the limited resources to facilitate staff spending more time in the field with former child combatants. The revised position of Child Welfare Officer limits the role to 'logistical' issues. This contributes to some disparity between the understanding in RDRC HQ and the understanding in Muhoza on the situation, needs and extent of vulnerability of former child combatants. This has the potential to further mitigate effective follow-up.

182. As the project has struggled with this issue for some time it is critical that the RDRC takes time in this final year of the project to appropriately audit and understand just what is needed to facilitate effective follow-up in the case of former child combatants. While the roles at HQ may be logistical, greater exposure to the situation in the field is still required and on the everyday lives of former child combatants. This may be a case of enhancing the cooperation with the National Commission for Children (NCC) and with the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) to appropriately plan, fine tune and resource follow up services to former child combatants. This should constitute a priority for the Commission in 2017.

183. The previous evaluation made observations regarding capacity in the Medical Rehabilitation Unit. Specifically, it stated:

The evaluation praises the work of the MRU but finds that, in general, the MRU appears to lack effective record keeping, communications and follow-up systems, including regarding those patients that have been mainstreamed. Staffing at the unit is limited (1 x medical doctor/psychiatrist, 4 x psychologists and 3 x medical nurses) and they must work across Muhoza and Mutobo on often complex cases. Challenges such as staff burnout and provision of appropriate supports (such as peer supervision) are clearly evident and should be a concern to the RDRC if it wishes the MRU to be effective in the future.<sup>120</sup>

184. The last World Bank AM of the evaluation period (Q4 2015) identified that, based on the previous independent evaluation, the project should conduct a community information campaign through existing media outreaches, including elements of psycho-education.<sup>121</sup> Also, the Bank stated that:

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<sup>120</sup>Finn, 2014: x.

<sup>121</sup>World Bank 2015: 7; see also Finn, 2014.

Another issue to be addressed is the emergency service, for which private telephone numbers are being used, which leads to an enormous extra workload for some at any given time of day or night.<sup>122</sup>

185. At the time of this evaluation it is clear that infrastructural issues evident during the previous evaluation period have been at least partially addressed, including improved IT infrastructure in the MRU.

186. The MRU continues to provide a strong service, one that benefits from the training received during 2015 (and indeed 2016). It receives on average 15 cases a day through the drop-in centre and continues to utilise the mainstream services available to it, including referral to regional and central treatment facilities for mental health and other integrated challenges for patients (such as substance misuse, for example). The total number of disabled ex-combatants receiving support at the MRU is 3257, but 19 do not have *Mutuelle de Santé*. These 19 ex-combatants must wait until the next fiscal year to register for the benefit.

187. The team at the MRU takes a holistic approach when working with ex-combatants and their families by assessing not only the needs of the ex-combatant but also the needs of other family members who may be affected by the behaviour of the ex-combatant or who may display symptoms of underlying mental health issues. The MRU then refers the family to civilian structures before taking a more in-depth assessment of the ex-combatant and prescribing a suitable course of treatment.

188. However, it remains the case that the MRU appears under-staffed and under-resourced. Some staff in the MRU appears chronically overworked. The RDRC indicates that it is in the process of hiring 3 new psychologists before the end of 2016. But the Commission still needs to address how to alleviate immediate acute pressures (the issue with phone access persists, for example) while aligning the work of the MRU (particularly in mental health) with better access to mainstream infrastructure and services. One example of this is finding how the MRU can have ambulance support for transporting often violent (to staff or to themselves) patients who are being moved in a pick-up without paramedic support or security for the staff. Violent incidents have occurred, as have dangerous absconding of patients while in transit.

189. The team in the MRU and the RDRC team in the field are unanimous in the observation that there is an increasing incidence of acute mental health issues, often pertaining to environmental triggers in long-demobilised ex-combatants. Furthermore, there is a clear sense that the community structures dealing with these incidences, including the community health animators, are wholly under-equipped to deal with the prevalence or severity of cases. It is critical that the RDRC brings these observations and the further expertise of field staff to the conversation with government around mainstreaming and budget allocations for mental health.

190. Similarly, efforts to sensitise the community appear to have occurred but not in any planned, systematic way or in a manner specific to de-mystifying how to seek help for ex-combatants in the family who are enduring mental health challenges, particularly acute or newly emerged challenges. This should also be on the table for highlighting with the relevant line ministries like MINSANTE and MINICOFIN.

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<sup>122</sup>Ibid: 9.

191. **Challenges regarding M&E performance and infrastructure, poor collection of data and the disjoint between the periphery and the centre.**

192. In the project, the functions of M&E and MIS appear hamstrung or functioning poorly at different times and for apparently different reasons.

193. The MIS department and systems have benefited from technical assistance during 2015,<sup>123</sup> which has included data cleaning and an overhaul of the database structure, and the installation of various platforms and a server.<sup>124</sup> The consultant's report of 2015 identified seven recommendations for further action but at the time of evaluation little appears to have been implemented. Furthermore, the database remains in a difficult-to-manage state with limited recent updating of ex-combatant details, including contact details and whereabouts. Relevant data from the 2015 Tracer, PVS and CDS does not appear to have been integrated into the database and, in general, it does not have an updated representation of ex-combatants who have gone through the project. At the time of writing, the consultancy team for the 2016 studies has new contact details for 1370 ex-combatants of which 700 have new residential addresses. It will be made available to the RDRC once the studies are accepted.

194. The database is reportedly without an application to facilitate safe access to data. In simple terms this means that, in order to update the database such as a change of details of ex-combatants, the MIS staff must write each entry in code (MySQL) which is time-consuming and restricts access to data by the MIS staff – no data entry personnel can be used and no staff can easily and safely access the information in the database.

195. Currently, the extent to which the MIS must be in alignment with other government databases is unclear, including for the post-SEDRP phase. However, it would be sensible to plan for some kind of integration with the data in MINALOC and to consider how the database relates to the central registration of ex-combatants in the Reserve Force, particularly given the intention of the Reserve Force to conduct a census of former child combatants (a notoriously difficult group to trace).

## **2.7 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry**

196. The 2016 evaluation confirms the findings of the 2015 evaluation. Project preparation, design and quality at entry remain rated as **satisfactory**. They were responsive to the GoR policy frameworks at the time of project effectiveness (2009) and at the time of the first and second AFs. The original project aligned specifically with the priorities of EDPRS-1, particularly in the areas of social protection where EDPRS-1: (i) planned to extend coverage of vulnerable persons by social safety nets from 12 percent to 20 percent; (ii) planned to ensure that 38 percent of vulnerable people graduating from livelihood enhancement schemes achieves economic independence; and (iii) planned to ensure that *Mutuelles de Santé* coverage extends to all target groups.<sup>125</sup>

197. EDPRS-1 aimed to ensure that evidence based social protection policy-making and implementation occurred in MINALOC and that CSOs regularly evaluated their own and

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<sup>123</sup>Zafar, 2015.

<sup>124</sup>Includes: (i) MySQL server; (ii) SQL WorkBench; (iii) Apache Web server; (iv) ODK aggregate server; and (v) MS SQL Server 2008R2. See Ibid.

<sup>125</sup>GoR, 2008: 42.

MINALOC's social protection activities.<sup>126</sup> As an agency under MINALOC, the RDRC falls between these two strands.

198. With the extension of the project it has aligned with the GoR's EDPRS 2, particularly given the focus on disability and gender mainstreaming, both of which are cross-cutting themes in the EDPRS 2. In particular, the project is relevant to Priority 2 - Improving service delivery thread, rule of law, unity and reconciliation, security and stability (including regional peace and stability)<sup>127</sup>, as well as to the Cross Cutting Issues (CCI) of (i) Gender and Family (reducing poverty levels among men and women, malnutrition, gender based violence and other related conflicts at both family and community level) and (ii) Disability & Social Inclusion (including ensuring accessible infrastructure and information for people with disabilities).<sup>128</sup>

199. The project has aligned with GoR's National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) and Social Protection Implementation Planning (SPIP). In particular, this alignment has been made with key projected outcomes for the Social Protection Sector, namely (i) Outcome 3: *Increased coverage of gender-sensitive social protection programmes that support the provision of a minimum income for families*, and (ii) Outcome 6: *Social development and complementary programmes to social protection implemented to support family and community efforts to move out of poverty*. It has achieved this alignment by emphasising activities, support and outcomes for female ex-combatants as well as for the dependants of ex-combatants and through the focus on the economic development of ex-combatants.

200. The project has been responsive to the requests of the GoR and, through its implementing agency (RDRC), it has strongly facilitated national ownership of DDR programming in Rwanda. The project has aligned with the GoR's responsibilities under the Arusha Accords.

201. In its original design, the project aligned with the then World Bank 2002 - 2006 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), which highlighted reintegration of ex-combatants as a crucial step to development. With the project extensions, particularly that under the current period of evaluation, there is alignment with the 2014 – 2018 Country Partnership Strategy. This strategy, while not highlighting DDR and rather positioning reintegration of ex-combatants to a strand of programming for vulnerable groups, continues to emphasize demobilization of AGs in the DRC as contributing to the "prerequisite for regional integration and cross-border investment", namely regional peace and security.<sup>129</sup>

202. The project has aligned with the principles of Do No Harm/Conflict Sensitivity and consciously looks for opportunities to mitigate potential negative effects of the project, as well as to find means to implement programming based on project learning. The project has been compliant with the 10 Fragile States Principles subscribed to by OECD/DAC donors, particularly Principle 1: *Take context as a starting point*, and Principle 6: *Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies*.

203. It should be noted that the project aligns particularly with Principle 9: *Act fast but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance*. The project is a continuation of assistance to the GoR in DDR that stretches back to the RDRP. By continuing that engagement, it has aligned with

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<sup>126</sup>GoR, 2008: 43.

<sup>127</sup>GoR, 2013: 19 - 20.

<sup>128</sup>GoR, 2013: 21.

<sup>129</sup>World Bank, 2014: 41.

the need to assist in the development of what has become a core institution (the RDRC) over the period of engagement.

204. The project has aligned with the World Bank’s approach to fragility and conflict as contained in WDR 2011 and with regional policy on stabilisation and development -*Reviving the Great Lakes Region: Regional Initiative on Peace, Stability and Economic Development*.

205. By design, at entry the project was satisfactorily identified, prepared and appraised so as to meet its PDO. The revised project activities in the period under evaluation address short fallings in the previous iteration of the project. The project does not sufficiently name and examine the external (including regional) and internal (socio-political) factors mitigating the demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of ex-AGs from the DRC and has limitations in its M&E Framework.

## 2.8 Monitoring and Evaluation

206. The evaluation rates the M&E of the project as **modest**. While by design the project M&E is strong, there have been significant shortcomings in the implementation of M&E systems over time, particularly concerning measuring project impact and in the management of data. Furthermore, despite efforts during 2015, the central MIS remains not fully functional or updated.

207. The M&E quality rating is based on an assessment of three main elements: (i) M&E design as reflected in the project design and proposed methodologies mapped out in the documents; (ii) M&E implementation as reflected in the actual project M&E inputs and the methodologies applied over the period of project effectiveness; and (iii) M&E utilization as reflected in the changes made in the on-going project, or as reflected in attributable changes made in subsequent interventions.

208. Regarding M&E design, the project was designed with a Results Framework that was updated during the AF 2 to reflect additions to components and, where relevant, issues specific to PDO indicators.

209. The evaluation finds that by design the indicators have been clear and practical and by design the project has ensured a baseline plus successive assessments of progress in the form of annual Tracers, PVS and CDS. These studies appear to have been owned by the RDR. Some indicators in the M&E Framework would benefit from revision to bring out nuances in the data and revise some indicators to be comparative (with civilian population and derived from the CDS). Suggested revisions are in Table 11 below.

**Table 10. Suggested Revisions to Results Framework (based on empirical data)**

Level	Indicator as per Revised Project Results Framework	Suggested Revision
PDO	Percentage of ex-combatants who are economically active (to be sourced from Tracer and CDS).	Revise the definition of economically active to be more nuanced with the household.
PDO	Percentage of ex-combatants who report social acceptance by their communities (source Tracer and CDS).	Reduce the target and revise to be comparable with that reported by civilians.
PDO	Direct Project Beneficiaries	Disaggregate to distinguish between ex-combatants and dependants.
Intermediate	Percentage of demobilized persons who are satisfied with the services and information provided in the demobilisation centres (source CDS and satisfaction surveys at Mutobo).	Disaggregate in line with current PVS. Remove CDS as a source.

210. In the current batch of M&E studies the RDRC worked in a transparent manner with the consultancy team. The RDRC provided access to the ex-combatant database and their sampling methodology but the evaluation recommends that, prior to commencing the next batch of studies, the sampling methodology be revised in line with the limitations of ex-combatant population and sub-groups. Specifically, the largely random sampling approach should be replaced with purposive sampling in order to begin to address the under-representation of vulnerable groups and avoid sample bias towards large population groups. Furthermore, the purely random sampling is not best suited to highly dispersed populations as the logistics of implementing a survey of same is too high to justify the approach in the context of monitoring the project results. The evaluation recommends that the RDRC should devolve sampling responsibility to the consultants but retain oversight of the final sample.

## **2.9 Safeguards, Environmental and Fiduciary Compliance, Procurement and Financial Management**

211. Project documentation identifies the project triggers safeguards regarding Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 401) and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12). The evaluation can confirm that sub-projects are screened by the RDRC for environmental and social impacts and, given that sub-projects are exempt from the preparation of ESMPs, more limited checklists are utilised by the implementer.

212. Regarding environmental safeguards, the project comes under the supervision of Rwanda Environmental Management Authority (REMA). REMA has the responsibility of assisting the RDRC to implement its environmental management projects. In doing so, REMA assists in the capacity building of RDRC staff in environmental management. The most recent input during the evaluation period was in March 2015 where training was delivered in Environmental Laws and Policies, Environmental Impact Assessment, Environmental Degradation, Climate Change, and Eco-Friendly IGA. In the period under evaluation no further trainings have taken place.

213. REMA continues to assist in the screening of small grant projects as per GoR regulations to ensure the environmental friendliness of these projects. District evaluation facilitators from REMA ensure the monitoring of the environmental compliance of activities implemented by the RDRC, including those under the SEDRP. The RDRC, and therefore the activities under the SEDRP, fall under the Social Protection Sector. An environmental checklist is in preparation at the time of writing.

214. The evaluation did not review fiduciary compliance but has reviewed the audit reports for 2015 and observed the functioning of Procurement and FM departments, including triangulating the performance of FM with Bank reporting and with feedback from external contractors and staff. Regarding caution expressed by the Bank in December 2015 on the size of the procurement department following staffing changes and the intervention of the Rwanda Procurement Authority, at the time of evaluation the procurement department appeared to be functioning well and processing contracting and follow up M&E of building and works projects in a timely manner.

## **3. Assessment of Outcomes at Time of Evaluation**

### **3.1 Relevance of Objectives and Design**

215. The relevance of the project's objectives is rated **high**. Similarly, the relevance of project design is rated **high**. The project's objectives and design have been relevant to: (i) EDPRS and EDPRS 2; (ii) GoR's National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) and Social Protection

Implementation Planning (SPIP); (iii) GoR responsibilities under the Arusha Accords; (iv) the recurring needs of ex-combatants and their families in the context of time-limited DDR programming; (v) national ownership as a pillar of DDR; and (vi) the Bank 2002 – 2006 CAS and current 2014 – 2018 CPS.

216. The second objective of the project<sup>130</sup> (Provide socioeconomic reintegration support to said members following demobilization with a particular focus on female, child and disabled ex-combatants) remains valid if at a much lower demand than originally envisaged in the project design. Activities and outputs per component (as examined in Sections 1 and 2 of this report) have remained consistent with the progress towards the attainment of objectives. To date, there have been no documented significant negative or unintended effects of the project.

217. In its design, the project activities have been relevant to the project's objectives with a clear logical framework between inputs and outcomes. Objectives have been clearly stated both during the original project design and through the AFs with a clear line of cause and effect between project financing and project outcomes. However, it remains the case that the exogenous factors in the DRC preventing the return of ex-AGs to Rwanda should have been more comprehensively explored in project documentation. Similarly, it could be argued that the other contextual programming and activities, including those under MINADEF, should have greater prominence in the discussion of the design of the project.

### 3.2 Efficiency

218. The project efficiency in progress made towards achieving its PDO is a measure of how economically resources and inputs are converted to results. It asks whether the costs involved in achieving project objectives are reasonable in comparison with both the benefits and recognized norms (value for money).

219. The main sources of data for efficiency have been the IFRs available<sup>131</sup> and the Auditor General's report of June 2015. None of the reports note any issue regarding the comparative cost of goods but rather minor observations about stock control, management and procurement procedures.

220. Regarding a comparison of cost per beneficiary, a rudimentary calculation for 2015 identifies the cost of demobilisation per beneficiary at US\$2,651 (for demobilisation only).<sup>132</sup> For whole programme costs per beneficiary the PNDDR (DRC) cost per beneficiary was US\$1,817,<sup>133,134</sup> the cost of the RDRP (Rwanda) was US\$2,065<sup>135</sup> and Burundi \$2,775.<sup>136</sup> Given the integrated services (and on demand nature of implementation), sufficient data is not available to calculate a rudimentary and regionally comparative cost per beneficiary for reinsertion and reintegration services.

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<sup>130</sup> The first objective of the project (Demobilize members of armed groups of Rwandan origin and members of the Rwandan Defence Forces) is complete. Demobilization of RDF is now managed through a separate SSR/Veterans process outside the project.

<sup>131</sup> Quarters 1 - 4, 2014 and Q1- 4, 2015.

<sup>132</sup> Simple division of cost of component in 2015 by number of demobilizations in the calendar year (146).

<sup>133</sup> ICR ICR00002168 DRC IDA-H0890 IDA-H3620 TF-54242, pp. 28-29.

<sup>134</sup> The DRC Reinsertion and Reintegration Project ('DDR III') is not yet calculated.

<sup>135</sup> ICR00001169 Rwanda IDA-36340, IDA-3634A, TF-52159, pp.19-22, 31-43.

<sup>136</sup> ICR00001169 Burundi IDA-H076, TF-53794, pp.26-28.

221. The increasing focus on the utilization of mainstream services and lobbying for appropriate centralised budget allocations to alleviate the transition at project close are likely to contribute added-value to the project as the implementer utilises existing services infrastructures, such as through medical treatment and vocational training.

222. Three other aspects can be noted here. First, Bank disbursement to the project has been prompt and without challenges for the recipient. Second, the project reporting via IFR has been largely on time. Third, the Bank has observed that efficiency has increased in FM, specifically, that a “review of documentation flow and accounting processing procedures introduced by the CFO in July 2015 has resulted in a much enhanced management of the department, evidenced in shorter processing time of payments to suppliers, resolution of unreconciled items, allocation of expenditure to budget items early in the documentation flow, and adherence to delivery date of returns to external stakeholders.”<sup>137</sup>

223. Based on internal consultations and consultations outside the project, as well as direct experience between 2014 and 2016, the evaluation finds that processing time of payments to suppliers is not improved to any great degree, and delays and lack of clarity are two common issues for suppliers of goods, works and services. Internal examination of processes in the project in an attempt to find the cause of delays has proven inconclusive. The RDRC has rightly strong financial controls on payments to suppliers requiring multiple reviews of invoicing at, at least, three different staff levels in the Commission and this may contribute to delays, particularly given the apparent frequent absence of staff during leave, at trainings or in the field. However, in general, there appears to have been a lack of promptness in paying some suppliers, often in breach of agreed payment schedules as per contracting.

### 3.3 Effectiveness

224. *Effectiveness* is the extent to which the project achieved its planned outputs. The project’s outputs are those defined in Section 1 above, ranging from payment and benefits to communications and reporting. The project is predominantly led by demand: demand for services and benefits (outputs) based on the numbers demobilized (with or without dependants) and demand for other support services, such as medical and psychological support. The project effectiveness in progress made towards achieving its PDO is rated **substantial** because: (i) the project has met the demand for demobilization, and (ii) has performed well in the timely and accurate provision of reinsertion and reintegration supports.

225. The RDRC identifies that it consistently meets demand for demobilization and those ‘recyclers’ or ineligible individuals (civilians, foreign ex-combatants) are dealt with in accordance with either the social protection mechanisms in Rwanda or the formal procedures for return to the country of origin. As in previous years, it has not been possible to confirm this via independent evaluation.

226. Regarding provision of demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration supports, the PVS found that the RDRC proceeded with reinsertion and reintegration payments and benefits as prescribed in the project documents and largely on time, and confirmed that benefits were disbursed to ex-combatants. These benefits included BNK, RG, VSW and THK. The 2016 PVS found that 98.0 percent of the ex-combatants had received at least one of the listed benefits; n10 of the n505 respondents had not yet received one of the listed benefits at the time of the survey.

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<sup>137</sup>World Bank, 2015 AM December 1-18 : 21.

227. This positive performance is continued and the census of eligible ex-combatants in the 2016 PVS identifies that 92.0 percent of eligible ex-combatants received their RG (87.5 percent received it on time); 98.0 percent received BNK (72.5 percent received it on discharge day); and 94.8 percent of eligible families of ex-combatants received their RK (95.6 percent did so on discharge day).

### 3.4 Sustainability, Mainstreaming and RDRC Exit Strategy

#### 3.4.1 Sustainability

228. Sustainability is concerned with whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding is withdrawn. Sustainability of outcomes and impact is based on a coalescence of factors, including the external environment and the impact on beneficiaries.

229. The sustainability of the project is rated **substantial** because: (i) sequential Tracer studies have returned a positive picture for the reintegration of ex-combatants indicating that the positive impact of the project is stable; (ii) the comparison of 2015 to 2016 Tracer data confirms a stable, good performance with a plateauing of impact; (iii) the GoR has committed in legislation to continue the work of the RDRC post-SEDRP and so services to ex-combatants should be maintained; and (iv) the project strongly aligns with other GoR social protection policy and programming and a large proportion of ex-combatants are clearly self-reliant and can access to mainstream services if required.

230. Regarding the positive picture of the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants, this is by now an established evidence base<sup>138</sup> with good comparators with ordinary community members.<sup>139</sup> However, there are changing dynamics in economic sustainability of results evident when reviewing merged data from 2015 and 2016. This is explored fully in the Tracer but it is worth highlighting some key trends here to indicate sustainability and mainstreaming.

231. Ex-combatants indicate an increase of 11.9 percent in self-reliance when looking to address a need for assistance (50.8 percent more ex-combatants indicating that they rely on themselves, with the biggest increase of 22.1 percent being in ex-AGs). There is however a decrease in those relying on spouse (9.5 percent of ex-combatants and 15.4 percent of ex-AGs). There is a positive decrease in reliance on the RDRC for general support, down from 24.6 percent to 8.7 percent (-15.9 percent) and particularly with ex-AGs (-24.3 percent to 3.8 percent). Reliance on RDRC for support in times of economic crisis remains low (8.0 percent in 2016 compared to 4.0 percent in 2014). There are increases in reliance on mainstream banking and on one's own savings when dealing with economic crisis.

232. In general, 12.8 percent more ex-combatants will resort to mainstream financial institutions (up from 0.0 percent) of which the largest increase is ex-AF (+20.0 percent, ex-AG are +7.0 percent). There are similar increases in reliance on savings: +23 percent for ex-AF and +13.0 percent for ex-AG. Furthermore, ex-combatants report an increased membership of SACCO, up generally by 14.0 percent (+11.0 percent to 35.1 percent of ex-AF and +16.0 percent to 37.1 percent for ex-AG), and a decrease in defaults on credit (-18 percent for ex-AF to 14.0 percent and -12.0 percent to 4.2 percent for ex-AG). Unemployment also shows a decrease, most markedly for disabled ex-combatants (-21 percent to 24.3 percent of disabled respondents). Of

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<sup>138</sup>Finn (Tracer) 2015 and 2016.

<sup>139</sup>Finn (2016) (CDS).

those who are unemployed, 36.5 percent indicate that it is because of lack of access to networks or patronage (+23.0 percent, composed of +21.0 percent ex-AF, +24.0 percent ex-AG and +33.0 percent disabled ex-combatants). In a final solid indicator of access to mainstream services there is no general change in ex-combatants reporting that they are able to access social services through local government or central government social services offices (rather than through the RDRC). Specifically, the level remains at 74.3 percent (71.1 percent in 2014) with the major changes experienced by former child ex-combatants (-15.0 percent to 72.5 percent) and disabled ex-combatants (+15.0 percent to 66.7 percent).

### **3.4.2 Mainstreaming**

233. Mainstreaming is included in this section of the evaluation as it is the key programmatic approach to ensure the sustainability of project activities after the close of the project, as well as a way to draw on complementary mainstream programming to maximize impact of the SEDRP. The efficacy, coherence and relevance of the mainstreaming approach (no real strategy document exists) influence the rating for the sustainability of the project.

234. As outlined in the 2015 evaluation and again in this document, there is a positive legal framework for the mainstreaming of the project. But, in reality, mainstreaming means the further institutional and explicit alignment of the RDRC under MINALOC, the implementation of new organisational structures, and the increased cooperation on mainstream services and partnerships to meet the needs of ex-combatants and to alleviate the acute and chronic stresses on existing services provided via the project.

235. The continuation of the work of the project (alongside the other work of the RDRC already financed through the GoR and implemented in cooperation with a variety of line ministries) is provided for by the Law 'Establishing the Rwanda Demobilization Commission (RDRC) and Determining its Responsibilities, Organisation and Functioning.'<sup>140</sup> Under this law there is provision for a new organisational structure for the RDRC and salary scales in line with public service. Transition will not happen until 2017 but currently there is a new post of SG as part of the gradual shift to a new organisational structure and subsequent shifting of roles. Basic cosmetic issues were being addressed during the evaluation with changes in the RDRC URL and email addresses from the .org.rw domain to .gov.rw.

236. Work plans, including that for the final year of the project 2017,<sup>141</sup> indicate some focus on activities specifically designated as mainstreaming under the objective of 'ex-combatants actively participating in mainstream programmes,<sup>142</sup> including: (i) ex-combatants and community orientation; (ii) consultations with line ministries and agencies; (iii) review of inclusion of ex-combatants in the mainstream plan of the EDPRS; (iv) HIV/Aids outreach; (v) advocacy meetings to ensure employment of ex-combatants; (vi) capacity building of local authorities; and (vii) organising a national conference on mainstreaming and reintegration of ex-combatants. The evaluation observes that the RDRC has worked for sometime in a manner consistent with mainstreaming (as outlined earlier in this report) and has already begun the advocacy at central government level including in MINACOFIN for allocations sufficient to maintain the appropriate level of DDR for ex-combatants (as of September 2016).

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<sup>140</sup>GoR, 2014.

<sup>141</sup>RDRC Workplans 2015, 2016 and 2017.

<sup>142</sup>RDRC Workplan 2017.

237. What is somewhat less obvious is the preparedness of the organisation as a whole for the institutional transition to being without the project. Issues such as the obsolescence of some roles in the organisation and the reduction in salaries in line with public sector pay scales are on the minds of staff but, overall, there is a casual approach to managing institutional change. There appears to be a lack of urgency in understanding the potential spoilers in the institutional change process. For example, there is a wealth of academic and technical research on how a high proportion of institutional change processes fail or are significantly negatively impacted upon by employee resistance. Understanding dynamics such as employee emotional intelligence<sup>143</sup> or employee defence mechanisms<sup>144</sup> (activated in times of stress) is highly relevant to the change process in the RDRC but they do not appear to be considered.

238. The evaluation notes that this is a risky strategy that possibly underestimates the difficulties in substantial institutional change and recommends that the Commission take time to ensure it has the appropriate strategy, skills and assistance to make this transition while respecting and supporting affected staff.

### **3.4.3 RDRC Exit Strategy**

239. The RDRC exit strategy for the programme is encapsulated in the plans and preparations for a centre of excellence in Mutobo. At Mutobo there is significant infrastructural development underway with a number of buildings under construction at the time of the evaluation and others newly completed or renovated. Structures include new dormitories and a new server room. The planning for the centre of excellence is guided by the internal draft brief note that states:

The RDRC has resolved to, and started developing Mutobo into a permanent centre of excellence for demobilization and reintegration practices. This is founded on its gains in contributing to peace in the great lakes region and fostering unity within Rwanda. Mutobo is the only centre of its kind in the region. Most of the practices applied at Mutobo are home-grown innovations and turn out among the very best especially when it comes to services for special groups including children, women, disabled and the chronically ill. The same applies to reintegration support given to ex-combatants and their dependants. Putting all the RDRP practices in one package and have that package accessible permanently at Mutobo centre will help to preserve and share the knowledge accumulated over the years through RDRP implementation.<sup>145</sup>

240. In draft form the objectives of the centre are planned to include: (i) hold an electronic archive (facilitated by AEGIS foundation that established an electronic archive at Kigali Genocide Memorial); (ii) facilitate and screen PDOP activities online; (iii) present short courses on DDR; (iv) deliver and develop hands-on skills training during PDOP; (v) provide a conference facility.

241. The evaluation finds that the centre of excellence is a challenging, exciting and complex project that physically is well under way. Following consultations during the evaluation period, the evaluation makes the following observations:

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<sup>143</sup> See for example, Di Fabio, A., Bernaud, J.-L., & Loarer, E. (2014). Emotional intelligence or personality in resistance to change? Empirical results in an Italian health care context. *Journal of Employment Counselling*, 51(4), 146-157.

<sup>144</sup> See for example, Bovey, Wayne H. and Andrew Hede. Resistance to organizational change: the role of defence mechanisms. *Journal of Managerial Psychology*, 16(7): 534-548.

<sup>145</sup> RDRC (n.d). *Draft Brief Note on Centre of Excellence at Mutobo*.

- (a) The evaluation agrees with the RDRC that it should consider revisiting the design and remit of the centre with facilitation by an external consultant. This would help clarify the objectives and the broad strategy governing the establishment and implementation of this enterprise;
- (b) The evaluation recommends that with the help of an external facilitator the RDRC develop a more detailed project concept note and tailors the document to different audiences and stakeholders, including potential domestic and international partners and donors;
- (c) The evaluation recommends that the RDRC continue to consider domestic partners (Peace Building Institute, for example) as well as international partially or fully comparable models including for proposed activities such as training courses, placement for research students and international DDR training;
- (d) The evaluation recommends that the RDRC fully investigate complementarities and collaboration with the AU DDR CP. The evaluation team has introduced the RDRC to the team at the AU DDR CP and begun the process of exploring linkages;
- (e) The evaluation recommends that the RDRC, in collaboration with the Bank team, explore potential seed funding via the Trust Fund structure in the Bank. The evaluation team has shared further details on this with the RDRC management.

### 3.5 Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

242. In line with the standard Systematic Operations Risk-Rating Tool (SORT) the evaluation finds the overall risk to development outcome **low**.

243. Regarding Political and Governance risks there is a **moderate** likelihood that political and governance factors could adversely affect the impact of the PDO. As the SEDRP draws to a close at the program level, the political and governance situation within Rwanda does not represent a risk to the PDO due largely to the political stability of Rwanda, a strong ethics environment, strong accountability in the public sector and high levels of participation. The GoR has shown clear commitment to the work of the RDRC and to mainstreaming. The main unknown in this environment is the effect of the extension of the presidential elections in 2017 and those political and governance risks external to Rwanda and that may affect the return of AGs from the DRC.

244. Regarding macro-economic risks, including external or internal (domestic) dynamics which pertain to macro-economic institutions and/or policies, the evaluation finds that the risks specifically to the achievement of the PDO are **low**.

245. As discussed, Rwanda has a stable macro-political environment and “remarkable development successes over the last decade which include high growth, rapid poverty reduction and, since 2005, reduced inequality.”<sup>146</sup> Economically, the country has performed well as it works to transform sustainably into a middle income country (MIC).<sup>147</sup> Rwanda has maintained a 6.9 percent economic growth rate and macroeconomic stability for the first three quarters of 2015,

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<sup>146</sup><http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview>. Accessed November 30th, 2016.

<sup>147</sup>World Bank, 2014 (a): 1.

and projects a growth rate of 6.8 percent in 2016.<sup>148</sup> In July 2016 it remained at 5.6 percent.<sup>149</sup> The main risks to the macro-economic environment are likely to originate elsewhere in the region. Given the high levels of economic and social reintegration achieved in the lifetime of the project, it is reasonable to argue that any economic downturn will negatively impact the economic situation of both civilians and ex-combatants and not necessarily contribute to any deterioration in reintegration.

246. The assessment of the risk of adverse impact on the PDO arising from inadequate sector strategies and policies is rated as **low**. There are strong policies in the social inclusion sector and in the work under MINALOC that target conflict affected populations. Risk is mitigated by virtue of the implementation of the project through the RDRC and the project's alignment with and relevance to social and economic policies such as EDPRS 2 and Vision 2020. Mitigation also occurs through how the RDRC, as the implementing social protection agency for ex-combatants, realises via programming the policy and strategy formulated by MINALOC. It is part of the sector working group and, along with the DGs of MINALOC and other bodies, addresses the needs of conflict affected populations and vulnerable groups (FARG, NCPD and LODA).

247. The assessment of risk to the achievement of the PDO stemming from factors relating to the design of the project is rated as **low**. The project is long established and in the final year of implementation. The client and the successive World Bank teams (as well as the network of advisors and Short Term Consultants) have retained a high level of experience in Rwandan DDR and in DDR in the region in general.

248. By design, the project activities have been relevant to the project's objectives with a clear logical framework between inputs and outcomes. Objectives have been clearly stated both during the original project design and through the AFs with a clear line of cause and effect between project financing and project outcomes.

249. Regarding risks to the achievement of PDO arising from institutional capacity for implementation and to sustain the project activities, the evaluation rates the risk as **low**. The RDRC as the main implementer of the project on behalf of the GoR has a proven track record in DDR project implementation and is widely regarded as representing best practice in DDR. Successive project evaluations have confirmed the RDRC as a strong implementing partner.

250. The parallel and complementary activities in the RDRC, including those implemented with the Reserve Force, the progress being made on transforming Mutobo into a centre of excellence, and the relevance of project design and implementation arrangements (via MINALOC) all point to a strong sustainability of results.

251. As discussed above, institutional challenges, particularly pertaining to M&E, MIS, former child combatants, the MRU and those around organisational change during mainstream, are real and present but overall do not represent risks to the achievement of the PDO. Similarly, frequent staff churn and the capacity and roles of certain staff in comparison with their counterparts in the field do present risks to the continued effectiveness of the RDRC but, at the

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<sup>148</sup>Ishihara, Yoichiro; Bundervoet, Tom; Sanghi, Apurva; Nishiuchi, Toru. 2016. *Rwanda - Economic update: Rwanda at work*. Rwanda economic update; no. 9. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.

<sup>149</sup><http://www.tradingeconomics.com/rwanda/gdp-growth-annual>. Accessed December 15th, 2016.

current stage in the implementation of the SEDRP, are unlikely to have additional impact on the project prior to its close.

252. The rating of fiduciary risk negatively impacting on the achievement of PDO is **low**. This rating is allocated in recognition that project appropriations have been made available on a timely basis and that within the evaluation period the implementer has provided the Bank with timely financial reports and, during 2015, provided the Bank with bi-monthly updates on the implementation of audit action plans. The 2015 audit by the Auditor General makes no significant judgements against the RDRC. Similarly, the audit of the internal auditor (2015 delivered 2016).

253. During the period under evaluation, and with the assistance of an international FM advisor, the RDRC implemented a new budget control system enabling better monthly monitoring of expenditure and comparative analysis of quarterly budget vs. spend data. Similarly, staff received on the job training during November and December 2015 from the international FM advisor, including on the budget control system and withdrawal applications.

254. During the period under review, the RDRC underwent a reorganisation of staff in the Procurement Department (a department which had received criticism from the Bank regarding insufficient preparation of procurement plans).<sup>150</sup> The RDRC fully disclosed issues with alleged irregularities in bidding processes for supervision of construction works that may have affected GoR funds (not project funds) and fully shared the advice of the Rwanda Procurement Authority investigation.

255. The rating of the likelihood of negative impact on achieving the PDO by exogenous environmental and social risk factors is **low**. There are few environmental risks associated with the project, which is implemented at a national level but with a comparatively low, widely dispersed and highly mobile beneficiary group. The project triggers OP/BP 4.01 and OP/BP 4.11 but no cumulative environmental impact is expected or evidenced thus far. Given the limited beneficiary group and their dispersal, the provision of RG to ex-combatants has not resulted in any significant negative environmental impact.

256. Successive Tracer and CDS studies have not found any evidence of involuntary resettlement or displacement of indigenous people. The PVS identified that in 98.4 percent of all demobilisations the people freely chose their place of resettlement.

257. During the period under evaluation, the World Bank safeguards assessment on December 9<sup>th</sup> 2015 identified that the construction of houses for disabled ex-combatants constitutes small scale, civil construction activities, that per se have low risks of causing significant adverse environmental impacts. However, the environmental management system in terms of contractual and organizational effectiveness was reviewed and found to have gaps and is not fully functional. A number of recommendations were made to improve the connection between the production of the ESMF and the production of tender packages.

258. At a macro-level regarding environmental safeguards, the project comes under the supervision of Rwanda Environmental Management Authority (REMA). REMA has the responsibility of assisting the RDRC to implement its environmental management projects. In doing so, REMA assists in the capacity building of RDRC staff in environmental management

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<sup>150</sup>See World Bank, 2015k.

with the most recent input being in March 2015 where training was delivered in Environmental Laws and Policies, Environmental Impact Assessment, Environmental Degradation, Climate Change, and Eco-Friendly IGA.

259. Also, REMA assists in the screening of small grant projects as per GoR regulations to ensure the environmental friendliness of these projects. District evaluation facilitators from REMA ensure the monitoring of the environmental compliance of activities implemented by the RDRC, including those under the SEDRP.

260. Regarding involuntary resettlement, the evaluation has witnessed no evidence of same and this is confirmed by the findings of the 2015 PVS, which indicates that 95.9 percent of ex-combatants identify that they chose freely their community of resettlement.

261. Regarding a risk to the achievement of the PDO arising from stakeholders who may or may not have grounds to object to the project design, implementation or objective or who may affect its successful completion by delaying or halting project implementation, the risk is rated **low**. In the period under review, there is no evidence of opposition to the programme by institutional stakeholders, beneficiary populations or receiving populations (for reintegrating ex-combatants). The role of the RDRC and the relevance of the SEDRP are understood by all the main institutional stakeholders, including local authorities. The only risk relates to the extent to which supportive stakeholders fully understand that the project is in wind-down and that vulnerable ex-combatants should be facilitated to access mainstream social protection when and if available.

262. There are no other risks relevant to the project at this time.

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## **Annex 2. Consultations and Site Visits**

Sayinzoga, Jean	Chairman (RDRC)
Umulisa Henriette	Secretary General
Musoni, Francis	Coordinator (RDRC)
J.P. Bagabo Brig Gen	Commissioner
Nyamurangwa, Fred	Commissioner
Munyurangabo, David	Commissioner
Mutarambirwa, Elie	Commissioner
Karera, Jane	COO
Kabanda Jeannette	Focal Person Safeguards and Reintegration Officer
Francois Kayiranga	CFO RDRC
Ngarambe, Patrick	Accountant
Bagabo John	Commissioner
Jackline Iryamwiza	Procurement Officer (RDRC)
Justin Segura	Project Coordinator MRU
Social Worker MRU	Social Worker, MRU
Kanamugire, Ephrem	Centre Manager, Mutobo
Raphael Ruchyahana	Manager Mohoza
Balisa, Charles	Child Protection Officer
Rutazigwa, Louis	M&E Officer
Felicien Menyande	MIS Officer
George Tukesiga	Resource Centre Development Officer
Musifula, Albert	PRO
Gatete, Patrick	PRO
Muksha, Verra	PRO
Theogen Nkuruzinza	Engineer, RDRC Construction Unit
Grace Mugabe	Communications Officer
<b>Others</b>	
Gad Niyitegeka	Director of Gacuriro VCT

Ms. Batete	MIGEPROF/gender office
Theogene Ngaboyamahina	REMA
Female Ex-Combatant	Name withheld by team
Female Ex-Combatant	Name withheld by team
Former Child Combatant	Name withheld by team
Former Child Combatant	Name withheld by team
Former Child Combatant	Name withheld by team
Former Child Combatant	Name withheld by team

**Site Visits**

Juice Making Cooperative	Gakenke, Northern Province
Muhoza	Muhoza
Mutobo	Mutobo
Guaciro VCT	Kigali